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CORNERSTONE

AN UNDERGRADUATE HISTORICAL JOURNAL

Department of History

University of California Riverside

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Welcome to the 2018 edition of *Cornerstone,* the undergraduate historical journal of the University of California, Riverside Department of History. The editorial board closely reviewed dozens of submissions covering a wide variety of theoretical, geographical, and comparative focuses, reflecting this department's rich diversity of research. The five essays selected for publication in this year's issue represent some of the finest accomplishments in undergraduate historical research undertaken at the department. Included for publication are the winners of three prizes for undergraduate historical research: the Peter Schneider Award in American History, the Thomas and Evelyn Gahn Prize for outstanding potential in original historical research, and the Cornerstone Award. We are proud to announce the selection of the following papers for for the 2018 edition of *Cornerstone* : "Creating the 'Education Community': How the City of Fullerton Lost the University of California Southern Branch and its Lessons," by Daniel Castaneda; "Broadcasting Across the Iron Curtain," by Daisy Rios; "For God or for Country?" by Daniel Ruppert-Majer; "Symphonia and Holy Rus: The Modern Application of Traditional Ideals of Orthodoxy and the State in Russia," by Mary Sarchizian; and "Enslaving the New World: Captivity and Slavery in Native North America," by Mark Reynolds.

Daniel Castaneda is the 2018 Schneider Award winner. In "Creating 'The Education Community': How the City of Fullerton Lost the University of California Southern Branch and its Lessons," Castaneda explores a little-known event about Fullerton's history, the city's attempts to lure what would eventually become UCLA into its boundaries. In the late 1920s, the University of California sought a new campus for its growing Southern Branch, which led to a competition between local municipalities. In studying the failed attempt, Castaneda argues, through the extensive and meticulous use of newspaper sources and local publications, that the city of Fullerton learned how to organize and build its identity as an "education community." In addition, the paper explores the legacies of Progressivism in shaping the city's efforts and the growing rivalry between Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Castaneda makes an important contribution to understanding Southern California development at the local level.

The *Cornerstone* editorial board is pleased to recognize Daisy Rios' "Broadcasting Across the Iron Curtain" as its 2018 Gahn Award winner, which explores reactions to American radio broadcasts in the satellite states of the Soviet Union after World War II. Focusing on broadcasts from Radio Free Europe, Voices of America, and Radio Liberty, Rios persuasively argues that Soviet reactions to American broadcasts demonstrate the efficacy of American broadcasting efforts. In examining case studies in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary, Rios brings to focuses on internal memos between Soviet officials attempting to respond to a formidable American effort to foment dissidence, underscoring the seriousness with which the Soviet Union, America, and its western European allies took the ideological front of the Cold War. Ultimately, Rios concludes, the American efforts were so successful that Soviet officials wrote to Nikita Krushchev urging him to create a radio station in the model of Radio Free Europe. Her investigation of the primary source material is commendable and represents an original contribution to the scholarly conversation surrounding ideological warfare during the Cold War period.

In "Symphonia and Holy Rus: The Modern Application of Traditional Ideals of Orthodoxy and the State in Russia," Mary Sarchizian challenges the commonly-held belief that Russia's current administration is trying to restore the Soviet Union. Sarchizian argues that Vladimir Putin wants to create a neo-imperialist Russia and that he is using the Russian Orthodox Church as a tool to accomplish this. Because of the diversity of Russian and former Russian territories, Putin must adjust his tactics for each region. Sarchizian spotlights Ukraine and Chechnya, two religiously independent states that Putin wants to bring back into the Russian Orthodox fold. Sarchizian contrasts the nature of Putin's propaganda in Orthodox Ukraine with the gentler touch he must use with Muslim-majority Chechnya in order to attain "spiritual security" throughout the new Russian empire. Sarchizian persuasively demonstrates that the Kremlin and the Church are striving toward "symphonia," which she describes as a Byzantine concept that "entails a harmonious unity between Church and State."

This year's Cornerstone Award goes to Daniel Ruppert-Majer's exploration of how religion did, and didn't, play a role in the Ottoman Empire's relationships with its neighbors to the West. This essay,

entitled “For God or for Country?,” challenges older assumptions that Ottoman expansion was motivated by a desire to convert these areas. He shows that while both Catholic and Protestant countries saw certain Ottoman incursions in religious terms, this was not always reflective of Ottoman politics. Ruppert-Majer argues that though religiously motivated battles may not have been the norm, the exceptions had a profound impact on sixteenth century Europe and on the modern historiography. He suggests that a greater understanding of not only the actions of the past, but how those events are remembered and incorporated into official histories can help us understand religious and political tensions in the modern world.

Finally, in “Enslaving the New World: Captivity and Slavery in Native North America,” Mark Reynolds traces the complex and dynamic relationship between Native American societies and various forms of slavery and captivity, arguing that this story deserves a more prominent place in the contemporary American consciousness. Drawing on some of the most important recent scholarship in Native American and Borderlands Studies, Reynolds examines various traditions of slavery and captivity that existed in Native America for generations before European colonization. Most of these traditions, which had spiritual, demographic, and political significance for Native nations, were not based on any kind of ethnic or racial hierarchies, and bore little resemblance to the system of African American plantation slavery that would dominate the American South in the Antebellum period. Reynolds explores the ways early European colonists exploited the Native systems of captivity they observed, to enslave Native people under their own racialized institution of slavery. Meanwhile, with the coming of Euro-American settlement and colonization, Native nations such as the Utes and Comanches in the southwest, and the Creeks in the southeast, altered and adapted their own traditions of captivity to contend with new colonial realities. In this essay, Reynolds deftly situates the

complex history of Native American peoples—as both enslavers and enslaved—within a national conversation regarding race and slavery that often neglects Native American experiences.

We are very pleased to recognize the efforts and accomplishments of the authors chosen for this year’s *Cornerstone,* and look forward to seeing their continued success in the future. The continued

publication of this journal would not be possible without the dedicated support from the staff and faculty of the History Department. The editors specifically wish to thank Professor Georg Michels, the 2018 faculty advisor to the editorial board, and Veronica Ibarra, the Undergraduate Academic Advisor. We also extend sincerest thanks to Kiril Tomoff, Chair of the department; Michele Salzman, the Graduate Advisor; and Alesha Jaenette, the Graduate Student Affairs Officer.

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Creating "The Education Community": How the City of Fullerton Lost the University of California Southern Branch and its Lessons

Daniel Castaneda

On June 25, 1948, Mrs. D.C. Cowles wrote a letter to the editor of the Fullerton News Tribune expressing frustration with business interests and nonresidents blocking the development of colleges in the city of Fullerton.[1] At the time, the city was in consideration to be the host of a new campus for Westmont College, which had outgrown its location in Los Angeles. Cowles, drawing parallels, lamented about the growth of the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and how "we, too, could have had that fine thing…had not the school's coming to those same hills in Fullerton in 1924 been blocked."[2] In 2018, her remarks could not have been more surprising. The city of Fullerton, located in north Orange County, considers itself "The Education Community."[3] With five colleges and universities, the city has poised itself to attract students from a variety of backgrounds to receive a quality education and grow within the community. More specifically, Fullerton hosts a junior college, a California State University, and other private colleges. Thus, it does not have any shortage of higher education institutions. However, the community's emphasis on education was not solidified overnight, and it was developed as the result of multiple setbacks and a willingness to strive. For example, in 1925, as Mrs. Cowles mentioned, the City almost hosted the University of California Southern Branch, which later became UCLA. By 2013, the campus was generating $12.7 billion in economic activity and providing jobs and well-prepared alumni for the city.[4] Certainly, the development of Fullerton and Los Angeles might have been radically different had the decision transpired differently. The lost chance to host the University of California Southern Branch, evidenced in newspaper articles and other local publications, reveals that Fullerton learned how to market its

community to nonresidents, mobilize different groups for support, and prepare plans for the creation of "the education community."

During the early 1900s, the population of California was increasing and subsequent growth of the University of California prompted interest for expansion into Southern California. In 1912, the Berkeley campus accommodated more incoming freshmen from Los Angeles than from San Francisco, and legislators called for a new school to be opened in Southern California.[5] Although these proposals did not immediately produce a new university site, they attracted enough attention and controversy in the California legislature to produce a compromise within the Board of Regents. Regent Edward A. Dickson successfully convinced President Benjamin Wheeler to establish a University Extension in Los Angeles.[6] While the Extension program seemed to be an indication of progress, it did not confer any degrees and only provided lectures for Southern Californians.[7] As a result, the University demonstrated a presence in the region, without committing to any longer-term plans. However, administrators at the Los Angeles Normal School envisioned an opportunity to begin conferring bachelor's degrees to students who completed the school's four-year program.[8] Until this time, the UC was the only institution in the state to confer bachelor's degrees and, in response, the Regents created an Executive Committee to determine the benefits of an affiliation with the Normal School.[9] Despite minimal action and input from the Regents' Executive Committee, the California Assembly passed Assembly Bill 626, which incorporated the existing Los Angeles Normal School into the UC as the University of California Southern Branch on June 10, 1919.[10] By 1919, Southern California finally had a legitimate institution connected the UC system.

The first few years of the UC Southern Branch were characterized by uncertainty and a series of compounding successes. Though the Board of Regents initially planned for the Southern Branch to provide classes, they did not plan to exceed the offerings that would be expected of a junior college.[11] But, as with the creation of this Los Angeles campus, the California legislature intervened and forced the Regents to cooperate with political demands. State Senator Charles W. Lyon introduced a bill at the urging of Los Angeles leaders to provide appropriations for third and fourth-year instruction at the Southern Branch.[12] President David Barrows cautioned against further growth and staunchly advocated that the Berkeley campus not lose funding in the process.[13] Despite his concerns, the Southern Branch continued to gain popularity and Barrows subsequently formed a new committee that would determine the benefits of instituting fourth-year instruction. With a positive recommendation from the committee, the Regents permitted fourth-year instruction at the Southern Branch and soon more students began to attend the campus.[14] However, because the campus was not intended to facilitate the growth it experienced, the Board of Regents was forced to act. By 1924, the Regents purchased additional acreage surrounding the Southern Branch, but they soon realized that it would be best to purchase new land.[15] Because of the rapid development of the Southern Branch, the Regents had no option but to begin searching for new sites.

The history of Fullerton's connection to the University of California Southern Branch has been largely forgotten due to lack of information regarding the process of choosing the Westwood site. Publications authorized by the UC discuss the growth of Los Angeles school sites affiliated with the UC and describe the final decision of a site, but do not address the alternatives that were before the committees. Furthermore, there is a lack of detail about the

decision-making process, ranging from the Regents' public commentary to numerous site visits by the Regents. For instance, in 1968, a centennial publication chronicling the growth of the system, focused on the memories of Regent Edward A. Dickson, who would later become the first UCLA chancellor. Regent Dickson proposed that the UC Southern Branch remain in Los Angeles and be built on a site known as the Wolfskill Rancho, but was encouraged by a fellow Regent that a search should be conducted for other potential sites.[16] However, after the search was conducted, only four sites warranted further consideration by the Regents. Verne Stadtman's book does not report where the remaining four sites were located, but confirms that the Regents chose the Los Angeles site for its "beauty, climate, and accessibility."[17] Indeed, in his own recollection of the events that led to the choice of Los Angeles, Regent Dickson also suggested that Westwood had the best transportation facilities and would best suit the anticipated growth.[18] Overall, the Westwood site was chosen and there was ostensibly no need for further reflection. As late as 1996, *The University of California: History and Achievements* was published to celebrate the UC but omits the history of the selection of the Westwood site. According to the text, Governor William D. Stephens signed a bill on May 23, 1919, and "with that act, UCLA was born."[19] While the author's intent may have been to simplify the story, it creates an omission of what actually took place and further asserts its inevitability. Though Westwood was ultimately chosen, it is important to learn more about how the decision was made, even from the perspective of a single city that was being seriously considered.

Fullertonians expressed their efforts to enhance their community through the ideals of Progressivism which brought together reform-minded individuals who wanted to improve standards of living, increase civic engagement, and empower individuals. The Progressive era

spanned from the 1890s to the 1920s and impacted the state of California substantially.[20] California Republicans were inspired by President Theodore Roosevelt's commitment to restoring the national government's role as a mediator in economic affairs.[21] Roosevelt's approach was a departure from traditional Republican conservatives who were skeptical of increased federal authority. Although the government could not solve every problem facing the public, reformers believed changing the structure would make it more responsive to the people. During this period, Americans were restricted by the influence of political machines and other moneyed interests which dictated the consideration of legislative efforts. In response, California Progressives, such as Governor Hiram Johnson, introduced reforms to strengthen direct democracy.[22] These changes were particularly influential in Southern California, where the "native-born Protestant Republicans" identified with the notions of progress and change.[23] Los Angeles was often viewed as the "urban paradigm of Protestant ethic," and featured numerous battles over policy and served as a gallery of Progressivist achievement.[24] The Progressive movement in California celebrated reform that would restore power to the people to control their government and improve their quality of life.

Progressives were committed to creating an education system that would serve young people and prepare them for careers. Education reformers, like John Dewey, called for the beginning of "practical education," that would prepare students for life beyond school.[25] While exposing students to classical texts and Latin was important, progressive education was more concerned with preparing students for jobs and contributions to society. Thus, education changed to subjects like grammar and home economics, while fostering the creative thinking of young minds.[26] Further, as students became older, institutions of higher education faced increased

demands for preparing students for the workforce.[27] Because there were more young people competing for jobs, it was vital that they had the skills that set them apart from other candidates. Many of the California Progressives who would implement the necessary change were educated in public schools and were staunch advocates for improving the University of California.[28] For instance, Regent Edward Dickson was known for being a Roosevelt Republican whose ultimate dreams of supporting the development of a "Progressive vision of excellence, efficiency, and public service" for the UC.[29] Furthermore, President Wheeler, implemented a fifteen-point plan that would improve and expand the University at the beginning of the 20th century.[30] His efforts produced twenty new departments and produced substantial growth for the University. The education system proposed by Progressives was ambitious and sought to prepare students for future careers.

Although the 1920s constituted a return of the Republican party to more conservative principles, the impact of the Progressives did not disappear. Prosperity characterized the beginning of the 20th century, but the brief "depression," tempered Republican support of future social and economic gains for marginalized groups.[31] As a result, Presidents Harding and Coolidge retreated from expanding government and stressed the importance of fiscal accountability and reduced government.[32] Despite an increased politically conservative mood, people continued to value the liberal idea of progress and were still willing to spend money on improving the national education system.[33] Certainly, Americans valued education as the way to prepare their children for better careers, and the prosperity of the twenties permitted the flourishing of institutions of higher education nationally.[34] Additionally, because of the changing composition of the Republican party, many of the California Progressives left politics for

opportunities in the private sector and community organizations.[35] They would flourish by devoting their time enhancing productivity and creating prosperous living conditions for their communities. The Republican Party retained progressive attitudes on education, business efficiency, and self-reliance when developing policies for the 1920s.

Before the UC began seeking alternative sites for the Southern Branch, the Fullerton Chamber of Commerce created advertising materials to generate interest in the city and market its progressive qualities to nonresidents. During the 1920s, sustained prosperity led to the migration of new residents, businesses, and industries to Fullerton.[36] Therefore, the Chamber wished to advertise various aspects of an "ideal place" to live, including education, amenities, and the government. Under the direction of secretary George A. Raymer, the Chamber began to create detailed brochures and pamphlets that featured rich descriptions and vibrant photographs. His first publication, *Fullerton: The Gem of The Valley*, was an attractive book that drew in the reader with a colorful cover featuring a woman beckoning them. As the cover suggested, "a welcome awaits you in Fullerton."[37] Beyond the beauty, Raymer informed the reader that "The educational facilities…represent the highest standard of efficiency."[38] He further credits the success of Fullerton to the "wealth of the district" and "little bond indebtedness."[39] Thus, to entice the potential resident wanting to settle in Fullerton, the Chamber appealed to their desire to save money. Essentially, he argued that unlike other cities, residents could have a quality education for their children without the need for excessive taxes. Additionally, Raymer emphasized the range of educational institutions available to residents, including five grammar schools, Fullerton Union High School, and the Junior College. Moreover, the Junior College was "fully accredited by the University of California," and prepared its students to be juniors when

they matriculated to the UC.[40] Certainly, for a parent wishing to prepare their child for success, it appeared that "Fullerton is the answer."[41] Secretary Raymer provided the Chamber of Commerce with the understanding of its own city and the language to pitch it, preparing them to attract attention before they competed with other sites in consideration for the new UC Southern Branch site.

After the UC announced that it would consider sites for the future location of the Southern Branch, Fullerton mobilized its population to develop the support and raise the funding required for a successful proposal. In December 1924, the Fullerton Chamber of Commerce created a committee, headed by Robert Strain, a local orange packer, to raise $5,000 to prepare the materials necessary for marketing the city.[42] Through fundraising, the City would be able to level itself against other cities and develop the maps and conduct outreach efforts necessary to warrant serious consideration. Additionally, the Chamber estimated that the initial investment was minimal in comparison to the projected $20,000,000 that would flood the city thanks to the university site.[43] Strain and his committee began to canvass homes in the Fullerton and, by December 24, the campaign raised nearly $2000.[44] The increasing funds bolstered the legitimacy of the efforts conducted in Fullerton and would generate interest from local groups. For instance, the American Legion passed a resolution in support of the effort to host the UC Southern Branch and would contribute physically and financially to reach the final goal.[45] On January 2, the local realty board created their own campaign to generate funds for the local effort.[46] Hugh Miller, the leader of the realty board campaign, suggested that Fullerton residents needed to contribute more if they wanted to host the university.[47] By increasing resident support, it was believed that more

coordinated organization between the realtors and the Chamber of Commerce could yield better advertisement materials and stronger support from neighboring communities.

Through encouraging community support and attaining the necessary funds, Fullerton began to create documents that effectively attracted attention to the city and appealed to key leaders. On November 4, the Board of Regents released a few requirements for a proposed site for the UC Southern Branch. Each site was expected to meet these expectations or have a plan to fulfill them. For instance, the Regents wanted a large size, preferably between 640 and 1000 acres, to accommodate future growth.[48] Additionally, because the school might have agricultural needs, there was a strong desire for quality soil, accessibility to water, and a favorable climate.[49] Last, for the benefit of students, the site needed to consider proximity to the municipal center, transportation accessibility and availability, and cost of living affordability for students.[50] With these expectations in mind, materials needed to succinctly respond to these requirements to capture the attention of the Regents and state leaders. Because of his experience working on *Fullerton: The Gem of the Valley*, Raymer was prepared to create a brochure that would be visually appealing, easy to understand, and well-detailed. Some of the images and text from his first book are reused or slightly modified in the new brochure he created. However, each section is tailored to respond directly to the concerns of the Regents. To address concerns about size and transportation, the brochure includes maps that provide visual context for the proposed site, as well as Fullerton's proximity to other cities.[51] Also, there are pictures of locally grown plants and accompanying reports on the soil and its viability for agricultural study.[52] In the final section of the brochure, Raymer declares that Fullerton would be an ideal site and notes that this effort is in support of the students and the development, by extension, of the state and nation.[53] The

brochure and accompanying materials were very well received. A letter to Raymer from Assemblyman S.C. Hartranft noted that the booklet impressed legislators and others due to its "practical condensed form," and encouraged him that the "book is paying for itself every day."[54] This positive sentiment was further affirmed when Raymer returned from Sacramento on January 3. Because of the impression that the booklet provided, state officials would be visiting the Fullerton site to inform their final decision.[55] Certainly, as Raymer suggested in a December 1924 letter, the advertising materials developed by the Chamber of Commerce marketed Fullerton as "an ideal city of high standards and one that would support a worthy educational institution."

When Fullerton had developed stronger support locally and at the state, new partnerships were created with surrounding regions and agencies, and a unity was developed within Orange County. Beginning in December 1924, Fullerton began to focus regionally on gaining support from surrounding cities. As early as the 15th, the Buena Park and Placentia Chambers of Commerce guaranteed their support and willingness to aid in the effort to promote Fullerton as the site for the UC Southern Branch.[56] Early collaboration allowed Fullerton to propose itself as a North Orange County site, which implied that there was more at stake for the region. Indeed, the placement of the UC Southern Branch in Fullerton would increase business, bring travelers and future residents, and increase attention to the county. By late December, Brea's American Legion and Chamber of Commerce would also contribute their support via endorsements and financial contributions.[57] In January, further support was increased through the county. Fullerton, aided by Orange County, would provide 1000 acres free of charge to the UC and the city would construct two miles of paving across the site to increase accessibility.[58] Additionally, the

Atcheson, Topeka, and Santa Fe railroads were supportive of efforts for the city to host the UC Southern Branch through their announcement to adjust the railroad service as necessary.[59] A partnership with these railroads would allow Fullerton to have, and later improve, their transportation facilities to accommodate the needs of students and the UC system. Beyond the adaptability of the railroads, lower fares were also promised to mitigate concerns about the lack of affordable and available transportation.[60] On February 9, Governor Friend Richardson and the Board of Regents expressed that there were four sites that were "most favorably considered."[61] These sites included Burbank, Fullerton, Beverly Hills, and Palos Verdes. Upon this news, the Orange County Realtors expressed their support for the Fullerton site.[62] Because Fullerton was the only favored site in Orange County, and the only non-Los Angeles county site, more support seemed likely. Thus, by early March, Fullerton was also able to successfully gain the support of the San Bernardino Chamber of Commerce and J.R. Gabbert of the *Riverside Enterprise* newspaper.[63] Approaching the final decision, the city of Fullerton cultivated strong partnerships that would emphasize the marketability of the location and provide a greater number of advocates.

Closer to the date of choosing a final location, Fullerton began to develop careful counterarguments and more assertively demonstrated their advantages in relation to the other sites being proposed. On February 2, J.A. Prizer, a Placentia packing house manager, wrote a response to an article published in the *Los Angeles Times* advocating for the placement of the Southern Branch in Los Angeles.[64] He began by expressing frustration that all the committee members selected by UC President William Wallace Campbell were citizens of Los Angeles. As the title of his opinion piece suggested, Prizer challenged the committee to be forward-thinking

and consider how the selection of the site would affect the state. Moreover, he requested that they not "permit local pride and selfish interest" guide their decision-making.[65] Also, to support the selection of the site, Secretary Raymer contacted numerous university presidents and administrators to learn about the benefits of a large school site. Most of these administrators, including Dr. W.O. Thompson of the State University of Ohio, advised Raymer that a large site was necessary due to unexpected growth and future demands – 2,000 acres being the most preferable.[66] While Fullerton did not necessarily offer 2,000 acres, the proposals suggested that there was an opportunity for expansion of the site into the future.[67] Furthermore, on February 28, the *Fullerton News Tribune* produced a series of articles detailing why Fullerton was the best site for the UC Southern Branch and responded directly to counterarguments. The articles emphasized Fullerton's appeal to industries, transportation facilities, and the high standards for home life in the city.[68] Essentially, the community wished to emphasize that the high quality of living Fullerton affords its residents would directly affect the students and other university visitors. In direct opposition to the proposals of Los Angeles, G.W. Finch, a Fullerton resident, called for the Regents not to consider the Westwood site simply for the proximity to its current students.[69] By identifying the great amount of international and northern California residents who attended the UC Southern Branch, he asserted that "students exercise the right of choice rather than nearness or proximity of the institution."[70] Although Fullerton had the necessary transportation facilities to accommodate student travel, it was important that the Regents recognized that the Fullerton site would not adversely affect attendance at the University. Prior to a final decision, Fullerton concentrated their efforts on challenging the placement of the UC

Southern Branch in Los Angeles and stressed the benefits of its site in comparison to the perceived primary contender.

On March 21, 1925, Fullerton residents awoke to a front-page headline announcing that their site was not chosen for the future site of the UC Southern Branch. For all the excitement that the opportunity had provided, the dream was finally dead, with the Westwood site being selected as the new location of the Southern Branch.[71] As a prescient comment by Assemblyman Hartranft suggested, “the fight this community has made in presenting its offer has won for it the high esteem and high regard of every section of the state so that, after all, there will be victory in its defeat.” Though Fullerton did not acquire the University of California Southern Branch, its efforts to attract educational institutions and have an important role regionally did not stop. By 1959, Fullerton would be selected among nine other Orange county sites to be the home of the new Orange County State College.[72] Further research might confirm that Fullerton’s lessons from competing for the UC Southern Branch were not forgotten, especially because of heavy involvement by the Chamber of Commerce in both bidding processes. While Fullerton was not chosen for the site of the UC Southern Branch, it learned how to mobilize segments of the community and market salient characteristics of the city. Therefore, even in their defeat, the Progressive spirit of the citizens was revealed in their commitment to efficiency and continual improvement. Fullerton was one step closer to becoming “The Education Community.”



Figure 1: Fullerton Distance from Surrounding Cities
(Courtesy of the Launer Local History Room, Fullerton Public Library)



Figure 2: Proposed Site of the University of California Southern Branch (Courtesy of the Launer Local History Room, Fullerton Public Library)

[1] D.C. Cowles, "Why Not Here?," *Fullerton News Tribune*, June 25, 1948.
[2] Ibid.
[3] "City of Fullerton - Fullerton at a Glance," accessed March 26, 2018, https://www.cityoffullerton.com/gov/departments/dev_serv/demographics/fullerton_at_a_glance.asp. Though Mrs. Cowles recalled the decision as being in 1924, it was not until March 1925 that the UC Board of Regents rejected the Fullerton site.
[4] Elizabeth Boatright-Simon, "UCLA Generates More than $12.7 Billion in Economic Activity," UCLA Newsroom, accessed May 8, 2018, http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-a-major-economic-engine-for-248792.
[5] Verne A. Stadtman, *The University of California, 1868-1968* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1970), 215.
[6] Ibid, 217.
[7] Ibid, 217-218.
[8] Ibid, 219-220.
[9] Ibid, 220-221.
[10] University of California, Berkeley, *Annual Report of the President of the University on Behalf of the Regents to His Excellency the Governor of the State of California* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1920), 260.
[11] Stadtman, *The University of California, 226.*
[12] Ibid, 227.
[13] Ibid, 228.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Stadtman, *The University of California*, 229.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Edward A. Dickson, *University of California at Los Angeles* (Los Angeles, CA: Friends of the UCLA Library, 1955), 47.
[19] Dean C. Johnson, *The University of California: History and Achievements* (Berkeley, CA: Regents of the University of California, 1996), 47.
[20]Kevin Starr, *Inventing the Dream: California through the Progressive Era* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucr/detail.action?docID=271714, 199.
[21] William E. Leuchtenburg, *The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 38-39.
[22] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R*, reprinted, Vintage Book History (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 211, 242.
[23] Starr, *Inventing the Dream*, 238-239.
[24] Ibid, 246.
[25] Michael L. Kurtz, *The Challenging of America, 1920-1945* (Arlington Heights, IL: Forum Press, 1986), 46.
[26] Ibid.

[27] Nathan Miller, *New World Coming: The 1920s and the Making of Modern America* (New York, NY: Scribner, 2003).
[28] Starr, *Inventing the Dream*, 237.
[29] Ibid, 274.
[30] Ibid, 228.
[31] Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, 283.
[32] John D. Hicks, *Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1960), 107, 216.
[33] Ibid, 167.
[34] Ibid, 186-187.
[35] Starr, *Inventing the Dream*, 272.
[36] Kathy Morris, Debora Richey, and Cathy Thomas, *Fullerton*, Images of America (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 2004), 7.
[37] George A. Raymer, *Fullerton: The Gem of the Valley* (Fullerton Chamber of Commerce, 1923).
[38] Ibid, 8.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid, 9.
[41] Ibid, 31.
[42] "Need Funds in Move to Get School," *Fullerton News Tribune*, December 12, 1924.
[43] Ibid.
[44] "Many Donate to Campaign for School," *Fullerton News Tribune*, December 24, 1924.
[45] Ibid.
[46] "Realtors to Renew Drive for Finances," *Fullerton News Tribune*, January 2, 1925.
[47] Ibid.
[48] "Requirements for College Quoted at Meeting," *Fullerton News Tribune*, November 4, 1924.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] George A. Raymer, *Fullerton's Proposed Site: University of California Southern Branch* (Fullerton Chamber of Commerce, 1925), 2, 4, 6.
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[53] Ibid, 23-24.
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Broadcasting Across the Iron Curtain

Daisy Rios

The histories and importance of radio broadcasts from stations such as Radio Moscow, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have been well documented in post-Cold War history. Radio broadcasts in particular are significant because they represent not only opinions and information of their time, but other people can then access that same information and those same opinions. This was exactly the case with American-funded radio broadcasts — which saw Soviet resistance to their mere existence — because these radio broadcasts allowed people under Soviet rule to engage with opinions and information outside their sphere of influence. The use of radio broadcasts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between 1948-1959 are important for illustrating how the division of Europe along the Iron Curtain affected utilization of radio in the Cold War era. Through examination of radio broadcasts and internal memos within Soviet leadership, we find that the Soviet Union considered American radio broadcasts a grave threat. Soviet leadership sought to prevent and discredit the legitimacy of American-funded radio broadcasts because they feared it would incite and encourage uprisings within the USSR and its satellite states along its western boundary.

The Soviet Union had long used radio broadcasts under the station Radio Moscow as a tool of propaganda in Eastern Europe before the outbreak of the Second World War. Countries neighboring the Soviet Union such as Poland and Lithuania had jammed Radio Moscow broadcasts from interfering in their own countries' stations, and this strategy was used up until the end of World War II. After the conclusion of the war, satellite states — such as Poland, Lithuania, and many Eastern European countries — under the Soviet Union were left no choice but to listen to Soviet broadcasts and their propaganda. Satellite states, by the American

government's definition, were countries within the Soviet sphere of influence that were technically independent countries, but were heavily guided and controlled politically, economically, and militarily by the USSR.[1] That control then extended to include radio broadcasts in those satellite states.

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) had been set up by the United States government post-WWII with the intention of helping the United States win a propaganda war that Radio Moscow had already started in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union years before. Although the United States had framed it as a way for defectors of satellite states to voice their opinions and experiences about their home countries, funding by the CIA and a mission statement that intended to "[u]tilize the political figures of such emigrations as rallying points and as symbols of unified opposition to communism in this country and abroad" demonstrated that it was also anti-Soviet propaganda.[2] Radio Free Europe first broadcast in 1950,[3] and Radio Liberty followed shortly three years later.[4] Radio Free Europe targeted the Soviet satellite states, while Radio Liberty concentrated on sending broadcasts directly to the Soviet Union. Radio in the American Sector—or RIAS—was smaller, and concentrated on sending broadcasts into East Germany from West Germany, and was the primary American-funded broadcast station in all of Germany.[5] RIAS was unique because of the location of its broadcast, since the proximity to the transmitters was relatively close compared to stations such as Radio Liberty, for example, which had transmitters in Germany that broadcast to the Soviet Union. Radio in the American sector arose in 1946 after the war after the Soviets had refused the Americans airtime on the already Soviet-controlled radio station in Berlin.[6] All three radio stations were aimed at feeding information into Soviet-controlled countries, and although their aim was to provide an

"objective" viewpoint, there was little doubt that these were meant to at least somewhat counter the Soviet broadcasts that were riddled with anti-American sentiment.

Voice of America (VOA) was different than the aforementioned three stations in two ways: one, it had been created during the Second World War as a way to relay information to American soldiers abroad in war-occupied territories, specifically Asia and Europe. Secondly, the objective of the VOA was solely American: it was to relay broadcasts that demonstrated American ideals and the American lifestyle.[7] Its initial and long-term goal was not to directly counter Radio Moscow and Soviet broadcasting propaganda. The VOA station maintained a position that was much less political than RFE and RL, as it was regarded as an official source for the United States government.[8] Therefore, VOA was not allowed to be overtly critical of the Soviet Union or its satellite states as it was burdened by its status as an official government broadcaster. Nonetheless, because it was spreading American ideals in satellite states and the USSR itself, it was still considered a threat to Soviet ideals.

The importance of radio broadcasts in this propaganda war were reflected by the scope of Soviet efforts to jam broadcasts. The USSR had begun jamming radio broadcasts from Voice of America in 1948, and had started jamming Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty almost as soon as they had begun broadcasting as well. Despite little evidence that early American radio broadcasts in the 1950s had either a large audience or a large influence, the USSR deemed them dangerous almost immediately and commenced jamming as soon as these institutions had begun broadcasting. In 1950, it was estimated that the jamming budget of the Soviet Union was 17.5 million dollars, more than VOA's entire budget for that year.[9] In 1952, about two hundred jamming transmitters had already been put into place throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union to prevent American broadcasts from reaching their intended audiences, and this number only grew substantially until jamming had ceased completely until the late 1980s.[10] The very act of jamming in and of itself had sent a clear message: American-funded broadcasts were not welcome in any Soviet-controlled country. Soviet jamming was so frequent and widespread that they had even unintentionally jammed Soviet-approved broadcasts in the East.[11] Though they did attempt to locate and target Western broadcasting, it was not always accurate, and jamming of Soviet-approved broadcasts was unavoidable in order to counter act unwanted western broadcasts.

Another sign that Soviet officials worried about the influence of American-funded broadcasts was to print out and send transcripts of American radio broadcasts to other government officials for the sole purpose of demonstrating what kind of propaganda the West was spreading. An example is the 1953 Radio Liberation (later renamed Radio Liberty) broadcast during the 1953 East German Uprising, in which thirty-three copies were printed and distributed to twenty-eight officials, two towards the TASS (Russian News Agency) department file, and three towards the archives. The broadcast was named "Vile American Radio Propaganda" by the TASS and described a Radio Liberation commentator urging Soviet soldiers to "[r]eturn to the barracks and tell [their] comrades how the workers are fighting for their rights. The revolt of the Berlin workers and their courage should serve as an example for the Soviet Army. […]"[12] Another radio transcript was sent out to twenty-nine other officials about the same uprising, this time originating from the VOA broadcasts. It was a similar call to the Soviet army to stand down against the workers of Berlin, even advising "[i]n case of danger, go to the Western sectors."[13] Soviet leadership, then knowing the content American radio stations were

broadcasting, could in turn counteract that news in their own Soviet-controlled broadcasts. Distributing transcripts of VOA broadcasts and handing them out among top-level officials to discuss them showed that the broadcasts themselves seemed to carry at least a hint of influence, one that Soviet leadership was taking seriously.

The problem was particularly important in the satellite states bordering western European countries. As a buffer zone between these two ideological forces, Poland was especially targeted by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and so jamming in Poland was deemed vitally important. In 1951, the Chief of the Main Directorate of Radio Communications, A.I. Zharov sent a report to the Minister of Communications N.D. Psurtsev detailing the ineffectiveness of Soviet jamming transmitters currently in Poland at the time, and outlined a new strategy to better counter Western broadcasts that they deemed "anti-Polish propaganda." The report from the Chief of Radio Communications listed all "anti-Polish" radio stations that had broadcast in Poland, with VOA sitting at the top of the list with broadcasts measured at 13 times a day.[14] It far outmatched any of the following Western broadcasts, with the second place coming in with only two broadcasts. The report ends with two important points made:

1. Protection on medium wave is to be accomplished from Polish territory, using the resources of the Polish Republic.
2. Protection on shortwave is to be accomplished chiefly from the territory of the Soviet Union, enlisting the equipment of the Polish republic to protect certain regions of the USSR from anti-Soviet broadcasts.[15]

Similar reports were sent back and forth as the operation was set in motion, and in the late 1950s, the KGB submitted a report that outlined the poor quality of jamming and how ineffective it was in detailed terms:

> Materials demonstrate that as a result of poor jamming, the programs of the radio station Voice of America were listened to in the majority of the controlled locations. Thus,

> Russian language programs in the suburbs of Kiev were unsatisfactorily jammed on 8 frequencies between 0530-0600, on 5 frequencies between 1800-30, on 6 frequencies between 2100-30…[16]

This report came after nearly a decade after the first jamming transmitters had been used in 1950 to block RFE, and yet the Soviets and Eastern European leaders had less than satisfactory results. Because VOA's broadcasts were indeed reaching the USSR, and frequently so, Soviet leadership continuously and vigorously set up more transmitters with more precise frequency targets. Poland, as it had proven to contain a large number of active listeners who engaged with Western radio stations, thus was a frequent target of Soviet jamming for the duration of the Cold War.

The Soviets, fearing widespread distribution of American radio influence, also intercepted letters that people in Poland had sent to RFE cover addresses that were deemed safe for sending letters to while trying to avoid Soviet detection. These cover addresses were stationed in countries such as England, France, West Germany — Western countries not under Soviet control. The interception of Polish letters came specifically after the defection of Jozef Swiatlo, a high-ranking police official who had in turn joined RFE and worked with the CIA. As discussed in Document No. 37, the Interior Ministry intercepted 391 letters from Poland to RFE cover addresses, many of which were anonymous but contained "hostile intent." Several letters made reference to Swiatlo, the RFE broadcasts, or both with one sender writing,

> [VOA] recently broadcast the revelations of Jozef Swiatlo. They should broadcast the entire series of programs, as RFE had done. What a sensation Swiatlo is for Poles. We are greatly indebted to [him] for the revelations, which are historic, and which are on everyone's lips. He has openly taught our rulers a good lesson, showing their true faces to Polish society…[17]

The report also notes that "[o]ther letters are about the programs of Radio Free Europe. They demonstrate the weakness of the ideological struggle and the need for heightened efforts in that direction."[18] Continuous jamming was already one example of "heightening" the efforts towards

winning that ideological struggle between East and West, and the interception of letters was another. This defection from a top leader in the Polish government was clearly a severe blow for Polish leaders as well as for the Soviet Union. Because Swiatlo was a top police official, not only did he have access to top-secret information, he also knew how the Soviet government operated within Poland and could reveal how the Soviets managed and filtered information favorably towards the USSR. The RFE described Swiatlo's revelations as "a tale of the evils done by the police, Party and Government to their own adherents, and horrible as it is, it is far less horrible than what all of these combined have done to the Polish people."[19]

The report highlighted the ideological struggle between the East and West, one that needed to be addressed and counteracted. The USSR was afraid of losing the ideological struggle that the Iron Curtain represented, and in Poland it was extremely important because it was at the border of said curtain. The number of letters sent was also significant because hundreds of letters were intercepted, and the 391 caught before reaching the cover addresses represent only a fraction. This demonstrated that not only did American-funded broadcasts reach their intended audience, but also that at least a portion of that audience agreed with them. The need to intercept letters, and then to react to what the letters represent, underscores not only RFE's success and impact on its audience behind the Iron Curtain, but the importance of developing and implementing countermeasures.

The fear cultivated by American-funded radio broadcasts in the Soviet Union was not unfounded. The worries about American-radio broadcasts encouraging uprisings were seen in two other important Soviet satellite states. The first took place in East Germany. The Berlin Blockade in 1948 was a major political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union

that put them directly at odds with each other. The Soviet blockade forbade access to railways and roads to Western Allies, preventing them from delivering food and supplies to the sectors of Berlin under Western control. The blockade was a response to the new currency introduced into West Germany as well disagreements with the other allied powers controlling Germany. The Soviet Union blamed East Germans breaking the laws set forth by the USSR and that the Germans had been incited by American and Western spies. Once again we see the Soviet Union portray itself as the upholder of justice, even going so far as to proclaim that the United States planned the blockade to generate negative sentiment towards the Soviet Union. In a 1948 Soviet broadcast, a political commentator argued:

> …on familiar lines that the so-called blockade of Berlin had been prepared over a long period by the Western Powers in order to camouflage the militarization of the Western Zones. By continuously repeating the story of a Soviet blockade of Berlin they were merely adopting Goebbels' technique of making a lie more convincing by constant reiteration. The ordinary people, however, were beginning to see clearly that the USSR had been forced to take precautionary measures against the effects of a unilateral currency reform in the Western Zones.[20]

In April, two months before the blockade officially began, the Soviet Union had tightened their restrictions about what was allowed into Berlin from the West, which they called the Berlin Transport Action. The Soviet Union was trying to discredit the United States and allied airlifts by claiming they had broken the law concerning what was allowed into East Germany.

The Soviet Union's fear of American radio broadcasts inciting violence was further demonstrated during the 1953 Uprising in East Germany. The uprising did not initially begin because of political reasons, but rather when a group of workers protested higher work quotas and demanded better working conditions. Radio in American Sector repeatedly broadcast this message before the first day of the uprising:

> In East Berlin today, protest strikes erupted at three construction sites of the publicly owned Business Industry Building against the government-mandated 10% work quota increase. RIAS had learned that, at the construction site at Friedrichshain Hospital, work will stop at 9 o'clock tomorrow, while the workers at the construction site at Stalinallee, Block 40, and the Peoples' Police Station Friendrichshain will take part in the strike at 2 pm and 3 pm. The protest resolution to the Zone Government will demand the reduction of the raised work quotas."[21]

The broadcast was not particularly loaded either way in terms of tone. It was very matter-of-fact and relayed this information so that workers would know of the strike before it took place. Objectivity then gave RIAS credibility amongst East German citizens. Nicholas Schlosser, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, noted that a segment of the East German population "listened to the station because they considered it objective and trustworthy."[22] Schlosser also wrote that the three East Berlin radio stations, Berlin 1, Berlin II, and Berlin III remained silent while the protests occurred during June 16th and the 17th, but condemned the protests viciously after they had already been suppressed. RIAS's broadcast the day of the uprising demonstrated that the protests had shifted from being solely work-related and that political demands were obvious in the protesters' minds as well:

> Today, in the Soviet sector of Berlin, large mass demonstrations of workers have erupted before the buildings of the Zonal Government protesting against raising work quotas, against conditions in the Soviet occupied part of Germany, and against government policies.[23]

The workers of RIAS were not allowed to let protesters speak directly, they could only report about what was already occurring during the uprising. Therefore, the workers' chants and slogans criticizing government policies in Soviet-controlled East Germany did not originate with RIAS. Rather, it was the work of the German people expressing their frustration towards their own government that RIAS then broadcast. While the workers of RIAS were not allowed to

directly let protesters speak on the radio, as it could be interpreted as too much of a political interference from an American-funded station, they nonetheless were sympathetic to their cause:

> When, days ago, we heard of workers' demonstration in Pilsen, many of us were disposed to treat this news with attentive reservation and describe it as "incredible." Incredible, not because the people in the west doubted the will to resistant of those behind the Iron Curtain, but because, in light of the predatory terror in the peoples' democracies with which we have grown accustomed resistance against the Bolshevik regime was evidence of either irresponsible carelessness, the expression of hopeless desperation, or the hallmark of a martyr's bravery.[24]

This was broadcast by RIAS days after the uprising had already been put down. During the actual uprising, the radio station generally only broadcast factual information such as locations of work stoppages, times that they were occurring, and relaying the slogans and work chants.

Radio Moscow sharply criticized RIAS broadcasts and countered them with their own. Instead of focusing on the original grievances of the protests, which had been focused on work quotas, Radio Moscow accused foreign agents of kick starting the uprisings:

> As is known, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has taken in the past few days the important decisions with the object of improving the standard of living of the population and facilitate the unification of Germany […] And it was these circles which, feeling they were losing ground, gave order to their agents provocateurs to promote disorders in order to counteract the powerful influence of the just policy of the East Germany Government.[25]

This radio broadcast explains the implementation of increased work quotas by justifying that the German Democratic Republic made those decisions to "[improve] the standard of living" and even bring about the unification of Germany. Consistently, Radio Moscow accused foreign agents of inciting the uprising. That same day, Radio Moscow broadcasted, "[t]he Falangist propaganda machine has set in motion deafening shoutings over the Berlin incidents in which there can be plainly see the hand of agents sent from West Berlin."[26] This was in addition to

another radio broadcast explicitly describing the detractors as wearing American clothing while associating them with Nazis:

> On June 17 during the riots in East Berlin which were provoked by fascist; we watched the following scene in the Postdamerplatz. A gang of hooligans in American check shirts entered the Columbushaus which had been empty for a long time […] There are in West Berlin more than 30 such organizations. Both the Reuter and the occupation authorities are kept informed on their activities. One of the biggest espionage and terror gangs recruited from criminals and the old Nazi scum found in West Berlin all the conditions which favored them.[27]

While there is no clear evidence that the RIAS had a significant impact on the changing nature of the uprising from focusing on working quotas and conditions to being politically motivated, the ultimate takeaway was that the Soviet government deemed it threatening enough to have thought an infiltration by West Germans was certainly possible and indeed probable.

The events of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 demonstrated how American-funded radio stations seemingly incited uprisings and disturbed Soviet control in its satellite states. American radio workers at RFE reacted to the revolution with shock at the overwhelming use of force directed at civilians. James Critchlow, a former worker at RL during the Hungarian Revolution, noted that "[t]he Hungarian uprising caused a shakeup at RFE after it came to light that Hungarian listeners to its broadcasts believed that U.S. military forces would help them in their rebellion against Soviet hegemony."[28] Much like the 1953 Uprisings, Soviet leadership at Radio Moscow believed that the Hungarian Revolution was a result of Western interference, particularly RFE:

> A correspondent of the American DAILY NEWS writes of his meeting with one of the refugees who left Hungary after the failure of the conspirators' plane. He bluntly said: "It was the big and strong America that pushed us into this by its broadcasts." The point in the question is, first and foremost, the provocative broadcasts of the so-called Radio Free Europe. This propaganda and espionage center near Munich engaged in such unbridled activities that it drew attention to itself in West Germany. On Nov. 9 the press service of

> the Free Democratic Party demanded that Radio Free Europe should be immediately closed down since its aggressive propaganda was to a great extent responsible for the bloodshed in Hungary.[29]

Radio Moscow leaders firmly believed that RFE in particular played a significant role in inciting the Hungarian Revolution. The CIA was aware of the blame the Soviets placed on RFE too, as a memorandum to the CIA director noted that the "RFE was, of course, charged by the Communists…with having incited the Hungarian people to revolt."[30] After all, it was easy to blame RFE or Radio RL in order to ignore the change Hungarians wanted after the revolution.

However, this was not like early 1950 political struggles between the Soviet Union and the United States. This was not the Berlin Airlift or the Marshall Plan, and it was not like the 1953 Uprisings that lasted two days and were squashed extremely quickly. Hungary's revolution lasted nearly a month and at that point in the Cold War, represented the longest and most violent reaction of any of the satellite states expressing their resentment under Soviet rule. So although the Soviets blamed American broadcasting and American influence, it felt hollow to the Hungarian people in the wake of the thousands of deaths that were revealed after the revolution had been suppressed.

As a result of their fears being realized in the form of violent uprisings and secret letters in satellite states, in 1957 a letter to Khrushchev from Radio Moscow German language services urged Khrushchev to create a radio station independent of Soviet control in order to compete directly with RFE. This letter mentions the effectiveness of RFE by recalling the Hungarian Revolution, directly stating that it was extremely influential in inciting the revolution. The letter gave detailed and exact numbers about how much more numerous American broadcast stations were by the sheer number of employees:

> It should be noted that the scale of our radio propaganda abroad is nothing in comparison with that of the West. Americans, for instance, in order to spread propaganda in just one country, relay several programs of the Voice of America and maintain a special radio station called RIAS in Western Berlin, which has up to 1,000 employees, consisting primarily of native Germans. To appreciate these numbers, consider that German broadcasting team based at Moscow Radio has only 30 people, none of whom has come from Germany within the last 20 years.[31]

Not only did the employees of the German Service of Radio Moscow acknowledge the effectiveness of American radio broadcasts in inciting revolution, but rather than concentrate on jamming or intercepting letters, proposed a radio service modeled *after* RFE and RL. In order to properly compete with American-funded radio stations, Soviet radio workers realized they would need to emulate them in two ways: first, by hiring more employees, and second, by hiring native-born Germans so that they could better relate to their audience. Most importantly, the significance of the letter to Khrushchev hinged on the fact that this radio station would have to be separate from the Soviet Union and its government. This new independent broadcast station would be funded by a private organization (exactly how the Crusade for Freedom had funded RFE and RL) so as to compete with the objectivity RFE and RL seemed to provide. Although a private company may seem contradictory to reporting objectively, the letter pointed out that because Radio Moscow was a state-controlled radio station, it could only report very limited information about other countries for fear that it would be seen as interference from the Soviet government itself. RFE and RL, because they were considered somewhat "rogue" stations headed by former defectors of Communist nations, were not subject to this burden and thus were free to broadcast most information they came across and deemed important enough to broadcast. Even though a Soviet radio service similar to RFE and RL never came to fruition, the letter to Khrushchev and its requests demonstrated that people working within Soviet-sponsored and

controlled stations were not ignorant to the power of American broadcast stations and were actively working on ways to catch up.

The Soviet Union very deliberately and consistently worked towards preventing American-funded broadcasts from making their way over the Iron Curtain, as well as making sure to discredit them through their own Radio Moscow broadcasts. James Critchlow, a former worker of RL, wrote in his memoir that "jamming had its positive effect on morale for us in Munich, one I'm sure the Soviets never intended. In moments of self-doubt, after a hard day of battling bureaucratic bosses and apathetic administrators, the jammers were always there, a constant reminder that in Moscow, at least, somebody really cared about our broadcasts."[32] After all, if the Soviet Union did not view the U.S.-funded broadcasts as a threat, as some sort of obstacle to maintaining peace in the Soviet Union and its satellite states, then there would have been no need for jamming transmitters.

There is no doubt that American-funded stations were widely listened to in Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union, and although the influence of said broadcasts is difficult to measure in a concrete manner, it existed and was clearly seen as a threat to the USSR government. Through Radio Moscow broadcasts, extensive years of jamming, intercepting secret letters meant for American-funded radio stations, and internal memos, we see that the Soviet Union did not underestimate the potential influence of Western broadcasts. Efforts to counteract the influence and spread of said broadcasts lay in three important satellite states: Poland, East Germany, and Hungary. They were targeted primarily because of their location dividing Eastern and Western Europe. Because their locations were on the fringes of the Iron Curtain, they were also seen as a weak spot that the Americans could exploit. The Soviet Union did not want the

physical buffer that separated them from the West chipped away by radio broadcasts potentially inciting uprisings and revolution. This is not to say that American broadcasting stations were wildly successful from the start, or that Soviet jamming did not affect their audience size. On the contrary, RFE and RL were not significant Cold War radio institutions until after the death of Stalin in 1953, and even then they were at their most successful after the 1950s. However, although American broadcasting throughout the 1950s experienced many internal problems both domestically and abroad, the thought of American ideals spreading over the Iron Curtain convinced the Soviets that American-funded broadcasts were a threat from their very creation because they were unsettled by the potential American radio had in disrupting satellite governments and encouraging violent protests. The numerous steps they took to prevent and dispute the information brought to them from over the Iron Curtain showed how significant American radio stations and their broadcasts were in the eyes of the Soviet Union and its satellite states.

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Daniel Ruppert-Majer

The second siege of Vienna in 1683 was a repeat of the showdown between the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire at the first siege in 1529. Both Austrian victories under the walls of Vienna signalled major shifts in momentum against the Ottomans. Diplomatic and military relations between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe were rocky for most of their 700 years of shared history for a variety of reasons. There have certainly been times in the history of the Ottoman Empire in which wars were fought for religious dominance and the expansion of Islam. Ottoman policies and strategies changed over time so it is necessary to look at individual instances rather than to try and categorize all of their wars as either secular or for the glory of Islam. This is why it is necessary to not only examine the specific aspects of the second siege of Vienna, but also to investigate the proximal factors and shared history of the combatants that were involved. Many of the Western authors cited in this paper stipulate that Ottoman expansion throughout the Balkans was largely because of religious ideology or jihad. Despite the pressure from Ottoman religious partisans conquer Vienna for religious reasons, the Ottomans were much more interested in capturing Vienna for its strategic value as a strongly fortified city that lay at the economic crossroads of Europe. The Christian powers such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, and Poland were the ones who leveraged religious conviction as a reason to go into battle. This disconnect between the two regions would exacerbate an already fraught relationship and would affect the way that Europe and the Middle East perceive each other to this day.

While religion was a crucial aspect of Ottoman warfare, scholars have had differing interpretations as to what extent Islam motivated conquest. Thomas Naff believed that “the

Ottomans conducted their relations with Europe under the guiding principle of 'the inadmissibility of equality between Dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (the abode of war, ie the Christian West)."[1] This is a defensible view; it is fair to say that the leaders of the Ottoman Empire saw their country as the premier military and political power in the world during the 16th century. For one the Ottomans refused to send permanent envoys to European capitals. They did however accept European embassies in Istanbul.[2] This attitude of 'you will come to us, we will not come to you' showed that they viewed themselves as superior to any European power. Naff also believed that in regards to Ottoman relations with European countries, "'any Muslim community/state is, theoretically, morally superior to all other societies' and the Muslims were under the obligation of *jihad*, to wage holy war against the abode of war until the ideal of a single universal Muslim community under a single law was realised."[3]This statement is much more difficult to defend. It is clear that throughout Ottoman history there have been multiple detentes between Christian countries and the Ottomans. The two most obvious examples is the friendly relations the Ottomans had with France and with certain Hungarian regimes. John Stoye disagrees with some of Naff's views. He points out that "The Sultan, after all, had not stirred in the critical 1670s when Christian Hungary was in a state of mutiny against [Emperor] Leopold."[4] This statement directly contradicts Naff's claim that Muslims being required to wage jihad against the Christians. That there is disagreement between professional historians shows that the root causes behind the second siege are not set in stone. There are differing interpretations, however some are more valid than others.

By the second half of the 16th century the Ottomans had defeated many of their regional rivals. To their eastern border the Safavid empire had been subdued by the Sultan of the Ottoman

Empire, Selim I. He then went on to defeat and incorporate the Mamluk empire on the Ottoman's southern border. The war against the Mamluks is important because the Mamluks were Sunni Muslims, as were the Ottomans. This means that it was not a war fought for the spread of Sunni Islam. It was fought for strategic and economic reasons, which were two of the primary justifications for the Ottoman siege of Vienna over a hundred years later. With these major powers either assimilated or cowed, the primary enemy of the Ottoman empire were several of the Catholic powers to the West. These countries were ones that the Ottomans were repeatedly at war with from the 1400s until the second siege of Vienna in 1683. They included Spain, Venice, and Austria. The events surrounding the war for Cyprus and the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 would set the tone for much of the next century.

A recurring theme that would emerge in the face of Ottoman threat was the creation of a Holy League in 1571 aligned against the Ottomans. This would be the first of several such leagues formed with the intent of defeating the Ottoman Empire. In this iteration of the Holy League, Venice joined forces with both the Papal States and Spain to fight the Ottomans.[5] There was a complication with the Ottomans declaring war on Venice: there was an existing peace treaty between the two countries. According to Ebu's-su'ud Imber, there could be no possibility of peace unless it fulfilled a certain requirement. He wrote that "to make peace with the infidels is legal only where there is benefit to all Muslims. When there is no benefit, peace is never legal."[6] He went on to claim that, "When a benefit has been seen, and it is then observed to be more beneficial to break it, then to break it becomes absolutely obligatory and binding."[7] While the decision to conquer Cyprus may not have been exclusively for the spread of Islam, it is very clear that the justification for breaking the peace treaty and initiating war was based on religious

law. When a nation breaks a treaty, especially when declaring war, their pretext for doing so is incredibly important. The Ottomans primary motive for attacking Cyprus was because of "Venetian protection for the corsairs who plagued Ottoman vessels sailing the route to Egypt."[8] However their justification as to why they did not have to observe the peace treaty was exclusively religious. Even with this religious rationalization, it was the only time in the 16th century that the Ottomans broke a peace treaty which shows that the Ottomans did not believe in constant warfare against the infidel Christians.[9] This is important because this singular event would help influence the way the Ottomans were seen at the siege of Vienna.

The religious reason that the Ottomans gave to vindicate their attack on Cyprus impacts the way that they are viewed by the other nations involved, even though this was a singular instance. When the Ottomans attacked other nations they were seen by many as a country that broke treaties in the pursuit of jihad. This made it far easier for Western countries to portray the Ottomans as religiously motivated in situations in which they are clearly not, as in the case of the second siege of Vienna. The war between the Ottomans and the Holy League in this case was thus predominantly a religious one, however this would not remain true in regards to the second siege of Vienna. Wars that are fueled by religious differences tend to leave a legacy different from those that are fought solely for the acquisition of land. This is why the way the Ottomans were characterized is so important.

The second siege of Vienna must be placed in the context of a long standing rivalry between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Ottoman Turks. Prior to the Christian Reformation, Western Europe had presented a largely unified religious front against the Ottomans. Europe practiced Roman Catholicism and were nominally guided by the Pope. Depending on each

Pope's policy, he was able to sporadically unite the nationalities in Crusades against the Middle East. However, once the Reformation happened religion became a tool that the Ottomans could use to play Protestant and Catholic nations off of each other. If the Ottomans were truly pursuing a jihadist policy based purely on religion why would they take the side of a Christian power, Catholic or Protestant? The relationship between the Ottomans and Protestants in Hungary is one such example of Ottoman realpolitik.

One of the factors that caused the siege of Vienna was the religious turmoil in the region of Hungary. This was a territory that was on the Austrian-Ottoman border and that was largely Protestant. In Hungary, the nobles felt that Emperor Leopold I had the "intention of replacing constitutional government in 'Royal Hungary' with absolutist rule; a number of them were accused of trying to secure the help of the French or the Ottomans."[10] The Hungarian Protestants were persecuted by their Catholic Habsburg overlords which led to rising discontent. In 1678, a Calvinist nobleman named Imre Thokoly rose to prominence as the leader of Protestant Hungary and as the primary challenger to Emperor Leopold I. The Ottomans exploited this division by offering support to an independent Hungary under Thokoly.[11] This is a clear example of Ottoman intervention in Europe that does not center around the spread of Islam, a direct contradiction to Naff's views. Instead of viewing this situation and others like it as a religiously motivated intervention in Austrian affairs, it must be viewed as strategically motivated. The Ottomans were not looking to assist Hungary so that they could convert the Protestant population to Islam, the Ottomans wanted to dismember the Holy Roman Empire. For much of Ottoman history they proved themselves to be tolerant rulers that allowed religious freedom. As long as their vassals paid tribute, did not rebel, and provided soldiers when called upon they were largely left to their

own devices. This hardly fell into line with the predictions of "Some preachers of the time [who] 'pictured the Turks as fulfilling the prophecy of Ezekiel (Satan will be loosed from his prison).'"[12] This preaching helps illustrate how the different empires viewed each other and their motives. Prominent voices in the West saw it as religious expansion while rulers in the East saw a Hungarian alliance as a prudent political move. This disparity also has enormous implications in regards to its impact on modern relations between a primarily Christian Europe and primarily Muslim Middle East, as will be discussed later.

The antipathy between the Ottomans and Habsburgs was not limited to matters of territory, but also included issues of prestige. When Mehmed II conquered Constantinople he claimed the title of "'Roman Caesar.'"[13] While this could have been an allusion to the new seat of Ottoman power being the same location as previous Byzantine Emperor's, some in the West feared that this meant that the Ottomans wanted to conquer Rome.[14] Declaring themselves to be Kayser-i Rûm was certainly a point of contention with the Habsburg Emperors and Christendom as a whole. The Pope had claimed the power to appoint the Holy Roman Emperor since Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne in 800. While this had very little effect on the two empires' day to day operations, it added animosity to a relationship that was acrimonious to begin with. Another factor that led the Ottomans to choose to besiege Vienna was its strategic location in Europe. It was a strongly fortified city that was situated at the crossroads of Europe. A system of roads connected it to Western Europe and the Black Sea to the East. Vienna could also be an excellent defensive stronghold situated on the border of Hungary that would protect Hungary and the Balkans from Western incursions if captured by the Ottomans.

The Ottoman Empire extended across three continents and included a variety of ethnicities and religions. It would not have been able to survive for over 700 years if it did not cater to the individual needs of its citizens. The primarily administrative and bureaucratic view was to govern all members of the empire judiciously, Muslim or not. The most obvious example, and the one most similar to Vienna, was the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. While the Hagia Sophia was converted from an Eastern Orthodox Cathedral to a Muslim mosque, the Ottomans allowed the Greek Orthodox Church to remain intact and operate across the Ottoman Empire.[15] This is significant in that the Ottomans certainly had the military power to wipe out Eastern Orthodoxy within Constantinople after they sacked the city, however they chose to allow religious freedom. Another clear example of politics taking precedence over jihad was when the Ottomans besieged the fortress of Kamenets in 1672. Despite their resistance, "The defenders of Kamenets were granted security of life and property, the right to remain living in the fortress if they wished, and the right to worship according to their own rites; they were also allowed to keep as many churches as they needed."[16] This does not fall in line with the narrative of Western priests who characterized the Ottomans as Ezekiel (aiding the release of Satan from his prison). Instead it points to the Ottomans governing in a pragmatic way that maximises non Muslim loyalty to the Sultan.

The Ottoman invasion of Crete showed how populations reacted to Ottoman rule. When the Ottomans attacked the island, "resistance was offered only by the Venetian garrison, which was supplied and reinforced from the mother-city. The Greek islanders welcomed the Turks as liberators from the oppressive rule of Roman Catholic Italians."[17] This preference for the leniency of Ottoman rule adds another dimension to the argument as to what degree the

Ottomans sought to Islamicize their conquered territories. If the populace preferred Muslim Ottoman rule to Roman Catholic Italian then it is clear that the Ottomans gave both religious and economic concessions that the Roman Catholics did not. The poll tax that non Muslims were forced to pay in the Ottoman Empire made Christian and Jewish citizens quite profitable to the Ottomans. It also provided an incentive for the Ottomans to not force people to convert. Taking these details into account it makes it very unlikely that the Ottomans would attempt to conquer Vienna on the basis of religion. It would be far more profitable, and in lockstep with previous conquests for them to allow Vienna's residents to maintain their religious affiliations. John Stoye believes that "the Turks also treated religious problems with considerable shrewdness. They did not proselytise in Hungary, because they wanted subjects not Moslems."[18] This adoption of realpolitik governance showed that the ruling class of the Ottoman Empire was willing to overlook the religion of its subject people as long as it was able to collect taxes from them. If the Ottomans traditionally did not conquer and convert their subject people whether they were from Crete or Hungary, then why would the case have been any different for their attack on Vienna? The logical explanation for their attack on the city was because of its strategic importance and the casus belli of intervening to support Thokoly's ambitions.

While the Ottoman leaders primarily based their policies off of what best served the country, there was another segment of society that saw things very differently. The puritanical Islamic religious camp such as the Kadızadeli sect favored the destruction of all infidels and the preeminence of Islam. They were often in disagreement with the primarily administrative and bureaucratic viewpoint which was to govern all members of the empire judiciously, Muslim or not. The Kadizadeli's most important member was Vani Efendi, a man who grew powerful by

his closeness to the Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa. This closeness between Mehmed and Vani Efendi was chronicled by "Mehmed IV's favourite, Abdurrahman Abdi Pasha his name appears as frequently as those of the Sultan's most prominent vezirs."[19] Abdurrahman Abdi's chronicle shows the extent of Efendi's influence, despite his lack of official role he wielded as much power as some of the highest members of the Sultan's government. His prominence and frequent mention are not by accident: "Both the Sultan and his grand vezir were young enough to be susceptible to the guidance of one such as Vani Efendi."[20] By this time period the Grand Vizier under the Koprulu family was the most powerful member of the Ottoman Empire, followed by Sultan Mehmed IV. Efendi wielded great influence over both of these men which gave him an incredible amount of power to implement his policies. Efendi was "insulted by the presence of non-Muslims in the empire, and the privileges accorded them."[21] This intolerance went in the face of much of Ottoman history in which a poll tax was administered to those following religions other than Islam in return for protection and freedom of religion. During the 1660s great fires raged throughout Istanbul and burned down many Christian churches. Under the instruction of Efendi the churches were "initially restored to Christian hands, but subsequently confiscated and sold to Muslims."[22] This persecution of Christianity and Judaism would be a subtle yet powerful force when the decision was made to attack Vienna. Efendi held a personal vendetta against those that did not adhere to his concept of Islam, he would be among those that would support the assault based off of his opposition to Christianity. Despite this fundamentalist pressure, the assault on Vienna would not happen for religious reasons.

The wealth of the city undoubtedly played an important role in Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa's decision to try and conquer it. Rules governing Ottoman warfare state that if a city

surrenders before the siege commences, the troops are not entitled to their usual share of plunder.[23] This could explain the composition of the Grand Vizier's forces. Mustafa brought roughly 140,000 men and around 150 field guns to the gates of Vienna.[24] This seemingly impressive army was in many ways a red herring. Tens of thousands of these men were camp followers, such as cooks and stable boys.[25] The field guns were small and relatively mobile compared to siege artillery. One reason that Mustafa did not bring siege artillery was because during the first siege of Vienna in 1529, Suleiman's massive cannons got bogged down in the rain.[26] Another reason that he brought so many smaller field guns is that 150 smaller cannons look more imposing than a few big ones. This could have been a gambit for Vienna to surrender without a fight so that Mustafa could collect the majority of the wealth of the city without the troops looting it. The final reason that Mustafa did not bring siege cannons was that he did not want to destroy the city.[27] Mustafa's preservation of the city adds credence to the idea that for the Ottoman Empire the siege was not about religion, it was about the secular desire for a strategically located wealthy city.

By 1683 a combination of the aforementioned factors led to Ottoman troops invading Austria and besieging Vienna. Sultan Mehmed IV had the romantic idea that the army could "still embark on a war of territorial expansion under the command of a warrior-king, and the sultan decided to lead the campaign in person, taking with him Prince Mustafa."[28] Despite this belief in his own valour it was actually his Grand Vizier that led the troops to Vienna. As previously mentioned, Mustafa had no intention of destroying the city so the primary means of attempting to conquer the city was by sapping. Instead of bombarding the walls and city with siege cannons, something that would have caused unintended damage from errant missiles,

sapping would only affect a small portion of the defensive fortifications and leave the rest of the city intact. This involved sappers trying to tunnel under the walls of the fortifications so that they could blow up mines to collapse the walls. This was slow and dangerous work, the Viennese defenders were able to countermine and disable some of the Ottoman attempts as well as collapse tunnels. Over the course of the two month siege the Ottomans achieved several minor breaches but were unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough.[29] Unfortunately for the Ottomans, a massive Christian relief force was fast approaching.

Although the Ottoman forces were not exclusively made up of Muslim troops, the forces bearing down on them were entirely Christian. The elite corps of the Ottoman military were the Janissaries. These soldiers were taken at a very young age from Christian families throughout the empire and forced to serve the Sultan. It was a meritocratic system in which talented janissaries could become very important and powerful men in the empire.[30] This elite, Christian segment of the Ottoman army shows that religion was not the sole factor in their political and strategic calculations. It was in fact the Europeans who placed enormous religious emphasis on the battle. In the words of Finkel, "The literary production of the time reflects the exaggerated expectations of contemporaries that the forces of Christianity would at last triumph after centuries of struggle."[31] The European leaders viewed the battle in overwhelmingly religious terms. In the month prior to the arrival of the Ottoman army, rather than prepare the fortifications and the garrison, Emperor Leopold I of Austria insisted on all members of Vienna's guilds attending mandatory prayer sessions.[32] Referring to the assembled forces, Stoye points out that the war was another instance of Christian European countries attacking the Middle East. He believed that "without much exaggeration, the war of 1683-1669 against the Sultan can be called the last of

the crusades."[33] The gathering Christian crusade required funding on a massive scale. Fortunately Pope Innocent XI was willing to bankroll the "army of liberation' for Vienna"[34] led by Jan Sobieski III.

The commander of the forces coming to relieve Vienna was King Jan Sobieski III of Poland. He brought nearly 30,000 Polish soldiers as well as the famous Winged Hussars.[35] Sobieski saw the event as a titanic struggle between religions, with his ultimate aim being victory for Christianity. A contemporaneous observer recounted Sobieski's speech before the battle, "We have to save to-day not a single city, but the whole of Christendom, of which the city of Vienna is the bulwark."[36] Tomiak would go on to claim that "the war is a holy one," a religious conviction that would be a driving factor for the Christian European army when they confronted and defeated the Ottoman army. After the ensuing rout of Ottoman soldiers Sobieski could not resist a laconic summary of the battle, "I came, I saw, God Conquered."[37] While the battle for Vienna served as an important strategic victory for the Holy League, it is clear that for the Christians the campaign was far more important as a religious crusade to beat back the encroachment of the "tide of Islam." Rather than gloat about defeating the Ottomans and going on to claim their territory, the Christian Europeans focused on the religious importance of their victory.

Despite the multitude of reasons that prove that there was a strong secular overtone to the Ottoman campaign, many lay people and even professional historians still view the situation in a bigoted light. Alan Palmer described the Viennese campaign as, "Even in decline the Ottomans clung to their cherished mission of thrusting the frontiers of Islam deeper into the marchlands of Christendom."[38] This viewpoint ignores history altogether. Not only had the Ottoman Empire

consistently espoused religious toleration to its subject people, it was not even attacking Vienna for the purpose of spreading Islam. As mentioned before, it was a perfect storm of opportunity between an expiring peace treaty, a sympathetic vassal in Hungary, along with several other economic and strategic reasons. Yurdusev wrote that "'any Muslim community/state is under the obligation of *jihad*, to wage holy war against the abode of war until the ideal of a single universal Muslim community under a single law was realised."[39] This is a gross exaggeration in regards to the Ottoman Empire, and proven to be false by events in their history. Sultan Selim I's conquest of the Mamluk Empire was specifically directed at another Muslim kingdom. The neighborhood of Galata housed large Christian and Jewish populations for much of Istanbul's history. The Jewish and Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire were occasionally persecuted by people such as Vani Efendi, but they still fared much better than religious minorities in Europe such as the Moriscos of Spain or the Huguenots of France.

Long after the Ottomans were defeated at the gates of Vienna, the specter of "the other" has persisted. It is no coincidence that the Syrian refugee crisis has become such a polarizing issue in recent years. If the same crisis happened to a white, Western European country the response would be to offer overwhelming, unconditional support. However because of the historic animosity between the Middle East and Europe, the response has been equivocal in many countries. Modern day Turkey is the heart of what used to be the Ottoman Empire. It has desired to join the European Union since the end of the 20th century, but still has not achieved membership. I believe that the shadow of the second siege of Vienna has been embedded in popular culture. In a Reuters news article, the authors wrote that back in 1997 "France, Germany and Austria are wary of admitting Turkey, concerned about the economic and cultural challenges

of integrating a large, Muslim nation of 80 million people into the EU."[40] Turkey was a developed democracy with a modern economy in 1997, it is difficult to fully believe the claim that it would be burdensome to integrate them into the EU. While it is surprising that France was opposed to their entry, it becomes less so when one takes Dr. Fariba Zarinebaf's explanation into account. Dr. Zarinebaf described in lecture how most of the French populace is not aware of their historic ties with the Ottoman Empire. She believes that it was an intentional move on France's part to omit their historical close relationship with the Ottoman Empire. This is because it can be politically fraught for a Christian country to ally with a Muslim one, both in the 17th century and the present. It has been over 200 years since Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798, and since then the relationship between the two countries has been forgotten.[41] These two major events show the lingering effect of how each side viewed its role in history. In these two cases the situation mirrors 1683. Because many in Europe for hundreds of years have seen the Middle East as a land of conquering jihadists, it has been much easier to characterize them as difficult to assimilate or undeserving of aid and political asylum in modern times. Modern Western leaders were able to stoke fears of Islamic terrorism because Western leaders and scholars have been doing this for centuries.

The importance of the second siege of Vienna does not end with the body count of those involved and the redrawing of lines on a map. The significance of the siege has extended to influence the people that have lived in Europe and the Middle East since then. The way that contemporaries depicted the battle bears great weight on past and present. King Jan Sobieski's description of the war as a holy one and his belief that they were fighting for God spread throughout his army so that the soldiers believed that their actions were sanctioned by the divine.

The Ottoman assault on Vienna was motivated by a variety of reasons. A small subclass of religious zealots such as Vani Efendi advocated for the siege as a blow against Christianity. However, the Ottoman Empire's history of religious tolerance and the presence of non-Muslim troops in the Ottoman army prove that Efendi had limited influence in regards to Ottoman policy. The primary causes of the siege can be traced to a number of secular issues such as over a hundred years of enmity with the Habsburg Empire, the prestige that would accompany its conquest, the strategic opportunity of having an ally in Hungary, an expiring peace treaty with Austria, Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa's desire for riches, and the strategic location of Vienna in Europe. The Ottoman assault and ensuing defeat is important in regards to military history and how it affected the map of Europe in 1683. The lasting significance of this battle is how the narrative of it was constructed. This is worth studying because it has led to regional and religious tensions that persist to the present day.

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[1] Nuri Yurdusev, Ottoman Diplomacy, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 8.
[2] Ibid, 72.
[3] Ibid, 8.
[4] John Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna* (Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 1964), 6.
[5] Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, (New York: Basic Books 2005), 160.
[6] Imber, Ebu's-su'ud 84–5; Fotić, 'The Official Explanations,' 33.
[7] Ibid, 33.
[8] Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 158.
[9] Imber, Ebu's-su'ud, 85.
[10] Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 282.
[11] Ibid, 283.
[12] Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 146.
[13] Finkel, *Osman's Dream,* 70.
[14] Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 70.
[15] Finkel, *Osman's Dream,* 47.
[16] Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 274.
[17] Barraclough, *Ottoman Impact*, 187.
[18] Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna*, 13.
[19] Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 277.

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[21] Ibid, 278.
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[24] Ibid, 62.
[25] Ibid, 65.
[26] Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 89.
[27] Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna*, 73.
[28] Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 273.
[29] Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna*, 134.
[30] Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna,* 34.
[31] Finkel, *Osman's Dream*, 278.
[32] Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna*, 42.
[33] Ibid, 186.
[34] The Enemy at the Gate, 166.
[35] Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare*, 79.
[36] Tomiak, 3.
[37] The Enemy at the Gate, 208.
[38] Alan Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*, 7.
[39] Yurdusev, *Ottoman Diplomacy*, 6.
[40] Reuters Staff, "Turkey's Collapsing EU Membership Bid," *Reuters*, Sept. 4th, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-eu-factbox/factbox-turkeys-collapsing-eu-membership-bid-idUSKCN1BF1TH
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Mary Sarchizian

Introduction

Russia experienced a resurgence of Orthodox Christianity after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with this resurgence came the return of an intimate relationship between church and state which had ended with the fall of the tsar in 1918. This intimate relationship between church and state in Russia is not a new phenomenon, nor did it begin with the tsars. This situation in modern-day Russia comes from the Byzantine concept of symphonia, which entails a harmonious unity between church and state.[1] With Russian Orthodoxy returning as the spiritual wing of the government, the Church functions as a means of providing Vladimir Putin with legitimacy for his actions in both domestic and international matters, and the government provides support for the Church as well as allowing it to be an influencing agent in policy and political agendas and gives it a prominent role in the life of the nation.

The Moscow Patriarchate plays an important role in national security by attempting to create "spiritual security" in Russia's periphery.[2] Spiritual security relates to the entity that controls the religious life of Russia and its periphery. The tensions and conflicts in Chechnya and Ukraine exemplify the long reach of Putin's hand in maintaining a new imperial Russia. Chechnya as a Muslim force poses an issue of external spiritual security, while Ukraine as an Orthodox force poses an issue of internal spiritual security. External and internal spiritual security are not matters of geographic location, but of religious affiliation and influence. The influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Chechnya is more subtle and the Patriarch of Moscow is acting as an external agent of influence in Chechnya due to it being a predominantly Muslim region. Ukraine is an internal spiritual security concern due to the Moscow Patriarchate's strong claim of dominance over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Moscow Patriarchate considers

the faithful of Ukraine as belonging to the Russian Church, despite being in a country independent of Russia. The efforts of the Moscow Patriarchate in maintaining a Russian Orthodox presence in Muslim-majority Chechnya and their refusal to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church autocephaly are closely linked with Russian supremacy over these regions and the larger goal of a modern Russian empire. The Russian Orthodox Church serves as a colonizing agent in Putin's plans for a greater Russian empire. The Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, is not only the spiritual leader of Russia but also its diplomat concerning issues in Chechnya and Ukraine. The modern-day Symphonia of the Putin administration has resulted in a linked endeavor between church and state for the sake of empire under the name of the "Russian Federation".

Chechnya: External Security

Although Orthodox Christianity is the predominant religion in Russia, the same is not the case for Muslim majority Chechnya. The Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin recognize this and must act accordingly to facilitate some level of religious plurality while maintaining political supremacy as well as inserting Russian Orthodox influence. Chechnya has long been a region that has struggled with freeing itself from its ties to Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared independence from Russia in 1991 but fell back under Russian control in 1999. Chechnya does enjoy some semblance of autonomy from the Kremlin under their leader Razman Kadyrov, who is the Head of the Chechen Republic and an ally of Putin. But this autonomy is not true autonomy. The freedoms and power awarded to Chechnya and its leader Kadyrov are limited and monitored to ensure that Chechnya is acting in accordance with

the interests of the Russian Federation. This control and monitoring also extends itself to religion.

The issue of Chechnya poses a dilemma of external spiritual security. This situation requires Patriarch Kirill and to act as a diplomat who must take into account the beliefs and needs of the Muslim majority in Chechnya. The Moscow Patriarchate does not have as much influence in Chechnya due to the small Russian Orthodox population in the region, but nonetheless some form of influence still exists, but is managed much differently than it would be if Chechnya were predominantly Orthodox. The power of diplomacy overrides the power of religious influence. Nonetheless, the Moscow Patriarchate must reach out and attempt to anchor itself in Chechnya. As one of the halves of Russia's symphonia, the Church must partake in empire-building alongside the government. This is evident in Russia's continued control of public displays of religion, diplomatic negotiations between Russian Orthodox hierarchs and Chechen political and religious leaders, and the continued efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church to keep native Russians in Chechnya in order to maintain a Russian Orthodox presence.

The Russian Orthodox Church has made an effort to encourage ethnic Russians to stay in Chechnya in response to the large amount of native Russians that have fled Chechnya since 1994. The Moscow Patriarchate proposed plans to build churches in Chechnya to provide spaces of worship for ethnic Orthodox Russians as an incentive for them to stay in Chechnya.[3] While not successful, this attempt to keep ethnic Russians in Chechnya is one of the many ways the Church has attempted to connect Chechnya to Russia. The Moscow Patriarchate serves as a colonizer, using the Church as an anchor to establish a link between Chechnya and Russia and further establish a case for the Russian state to keep Chechnya under control. The decrease in the

native Russian population poses a threat to Russian power as Chechnya drifts further away from its ties to Russia. The Moscow Patriarchate's efforts to encourage native Russians to stay in Chechnya are a means of using religion to maintain a demographic anchor in Chechnya by establishing more churches. These efforts include engaging in diplomatic discussion and bartering with the Chechen government. Patriarch Kirill held a meeting with Chechen leader Kadyrov on February 22, 2014 regarding the building of mosques in Russia and the wellbeing of the Orthodox population. Kadyrov asked Patriarch Kirill for assistance in building mosques in Russia, implying that it would be easier to control the Muslim population in mosques built by the state rather than allowing young people to learn about Islam online.[4] .

In order to maintain control over the Muslim population within the borders of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate must assert authority in a subtle manner, creating a facade of Muslim religious freedom and portraying itself as a friend to Chechnya. While it may seem that this move goes against Orthodox hegemony in Russia, it actually works in its favor. Considering how precarious the Russian-Chechen relations are, the Russian Church must establish an image of being the peacemaker. This image must be maintained so Russia can subtly increase religious influence in Chechnya without appearing as the aggressor.

Ramzan Kadyrov has shown support for Church building projects in Chechnya and has emphasized that he will not "divide the Chechen people on religious grounds."[5] But Kadyrov's desire to prevent religious division among the Chechen people is ironically a potential catalyst for more religious tension. Chechnya has a steep Muslim majority, with a dwindling Russian Orthodox population, and there is local resistance to religious integration with Russian Orthodox Christians. Municipal authorities in the Shelkovskoy district reportedly refused to provide land

for the construction of a Russian Orthodox Church.[6] There is also an atmosphere of fear among Russian Orthodox in Chechnya. The Orthodox Cossack leader in Shelkovskoy, Alexander Gritsakov, lamented the inability to build churches and potential for violent acts against Russian Orthodox worship spaces.[7] Kadyrov is complying with the wishes of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin by forming a facade of religious toleration in Chechnya. Kadyrov goes as far as to say there is no religious conflict in Chechnya.[8] The voices of dissent in Chechnya are drowned out by the diplomatic chatter of Patriarch Kirill and Kadyrov and by Kadyrov's insistence that Chechnya maintains good relations with the Russian Orthodox Church.

While Kadyrov tries to maintain a facade of religious peace in Chechnya, Putin has portrayed himself as a friend to the Islamic world. On December 12, 2005, Putin addressed the newly elected regional parliament in Chechnya, stating that "Russia has always been the most faithful, reliable, and consistent defender of the interests of the Islamic world. Russia has always been the best and most reliable partner and ally."[9] This statement is quite interesting. It begs the question of what kind of Islamic world Putin is claiming to defend. There is the stifled and subdued Islamic world of Chechnya which the Russian Orthodox Church and Kadyrov are trying to integrate with native Russian Orthodoxy, and there is the Islamic world that resists artificial religious integration and is not aligned with the Russo-centric agenda of the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church.

Although the Moscow Patriarchate appears to be accommodating to Islam in the Russian Federation due to its status as a traditional religion of Russia, it has also gone against the interests and freedom of Muslims in Chechnya. The Chechen parliament recently passed a bill in March 2017 allowing schoolchildren to dress according to their religious belief, which includes

the right of Muslim girls to wear hijabs in school.[10] The Russian Orthodox Church was not pleased with this decision and pressed for changes to the bill. Among the complaints was that of Hegumenia (Abbess) Cherniga, head of the Moscow Patriarchate legal service. Hegumenia Cherniga argued against the allowance of hijabs in schools on the grounds that the Russian public school system is a secular system and that due to this, the Federal Law on Education "cannot give schoolchildren the right to choose uniforms that match their religious beliefs."[11] The Russian Orthodox Church hid behind the claim that the Russian public school system is secular and should remain that way, yet they supported and pushed for the introduction of mandatory classes on the "basics of Orthodox culture" in Russian schools.[12] This course has been criticized on the grounds that it interferes with the secular nature of the Russian school system, which was the same argument used against Kadyrov's bill allowing for the freedom to dress according to one's faith in school. This hypocrisy was also expressed by the Russian government. In 2012, Vladimir Putin stood against hijabs being allowed in Chechen schools, asserting that Russia is a secular state.[13]

It is astounding how one could suggest that Russia is a secular state when the Moscow Patriarchate has so much influence in policy-making and its Patriarch essentially acts as both a diplomat and overseer in issues concerning the Caucasus.[14] The Russian Federation has put together a symphonia of deception and illusion. The Church and state work together to form the illusion of secularism while their relationship mirrors that of the Byzantine emperor and the Orthodox Church. It is a narrow harmonious relationship that excludes those outside of the Orthodox Russo-centric ideal.

Ukraine: Internal Spiritual Security

The Russian Orthodox Church has acted with caution concerning Chechnya and its Muslim population. It has played the role of diplomat and ally and has retreated behind the facade of Russian secularism when needed to subdue the freedoms of Muslims in Chechnya. The Church needed to establish control through means that did not overtly establish the dominance of the Russian Orthodox Church. This is not the case in Ukraine. The Moscow Patriarchate has authoritatively established itself as the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with the Ukrainian Church under the Moscow Patriarchate being the only canonical and legitimate Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Patriarch Kirill has also used history to claim its ownership of the faithful in Ukraine. The religious conflict in Ukraine plays into the Russian annexation of Crimea and the overarching goal of a Russian imperial revival.

The issue of Ukraine is labeled as a matter of internal spiritual security because according to the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church does indeed belong under the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. There is a historical claim to this assertion. The Baptism of the Rus', which marked the Christianization of the Slavic people under Prince Vladimir I, took place in Kyiv in the late tenth century. This was the birth of Russian Orthodoxy and gave Kyiv its title of "mother of all Rus' cities."[15] Ukraine may be its own nation, but the history of the Baptism of the Rus' helps make the claim that Ukraine played a central role in the creation of Orthodox Russia and that it must eventually return to Russia. Much of this sentiment is outlined in Patriarch Kirill's speeches from 2009 and 2010 concerning his vision for the Russian Orthodox Church which are collectively known as the *Russkiy Mir* initiative.[16] One of the central points of the *Russkiy Mir* is the collection of all peoples who wish to live in a global

community whose values "draw largely from the heritage of 'Holy Rus'."[17] This sentiment of Russia and Ukraine being so tightly tied together not only comes from Church hierarchy, but from Vladimir Putin himself. Putin paid a visit to Crimea after its annexation saying, "I consider Russians and Ukrainians generally to be one people." [18]

Both the Church and the government are in agreement about Ukraine's historical and spiritual relationship to Russia. Both are calling for Ukraine to return to its roots.
This return encompasses both a spiritual return and a political return to Russia. Both the spiritual and political return are inextricably linked together due to the nature of symphonia between church and state. The complete unification of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church involves both church jurisdictional unity and territorial unity. This is evident in Patriarch Kirill's refusal of Metropolitan Onufriy's[19] request to persuade Putin to withdraw Russian forces from Crimea.[20] Crimea serves as a microcosm of what the Moscow Patriarchate hopes to achieve for all of Ukraine: the spiritual and physical return to Russia. One cannot understand the tensions and violence in Crimea without first understanding the situation of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

The history of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine is complex and includes many struggles pertaining to legitimacy and canonicity. Ukraine does not have an autocephalous patriarchate that is canonically recognized by the Orthodox Church. Multiple jurisdictions exist in Ukraine but two main parties of focus include the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is under the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and the non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP). The UOC-KP is led by Metropolitan Filaret, the first hierarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Filaret requested autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate but

was denied and later resigned from his post and was taken in by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which later became the UOC-KP under his leadership.[21] The Moscow Patriarchate's refusal to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church autocephaly exemplifies its spiritual claim to Ukraine, which also plays into the politics of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

The fate of the UOC-KP seems bleak in Russian-controlled Crimea. Only about 600,000 Ukrainian Orthodox Christians living in Crimea are part of the Kiev Patriarchate out of the 2,000,000 Crimeans.[22] Sentiments from Russian Orthodox clergy send the message that the UOC-KP will have no place in Crimea.[23] Crimea is an example of what Patriarch Kirill and Putin want for Ukraine which is for the UOC-KP to lose influence and relevance and for the Moscow Patriarchate to assert its dominance. Moscow must be the sole spiritual and political authority of Russia's long lost territory. Ukraine is an important piece of the greater Russian empire, the "Holy Rus".

Patriarch Kirill's claim of primacy over the UOC echoes his goals for the Russian Orthodox Church laid out in his *Russkiy Mir*. Putin has also appealed to the idea of a historically shared Orthodox, Slavic heritage.[24] However, this shared heritage has one side claiming leadership and supremacy. It is a shared Orthodox Slavic heritage that is only legitimate with Russia as its head and the Moscow Patriarchate as its spiritual guidance. Since Symphonia involves a close relationship between the Church and state, there is a heavy atmosphere of nationalism attached to the Russian Orthodox Church. For the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to partake in this symphonia and "return" to the "Holy Rus", it needs to undergo russification. The reliance on nationalism that comes with the system of symphonia requires the surrender of Ukraine's independence from Russia and any hopes of autocephaly for its Church. Both Putin

and Patriarch Kirill understand the important role that Ukraine holds in Russia's form of "manifest destiny". And both of them will harmoniously go forward and engulf Ukraine politically and spiritually in its imperialist endeavors to restore "Holy Rus."

Conclusion

Chechnya and Ukraine both present cases of Russian imperialism and how the Church and state work together to bring the modern Russian empire to fruition, using different methods for each region. Muslim Chechnya requires a cautious and strategic approach and subtle introduction of Orthodox supremacy. Ukraine, however, involves the creation of a historical and spiritual propaganda in order to claim it as being truly part of Russia and an integral part of restoring "Holy Rus". The Church and state play integral roles in Russia's imperial endeavors. Each reinforces the legitimacy of the other and provides power and influence that both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Putin administration can utilize to establish spiritual and political supremacy across the Russian Periphery and beyond. The borders of Russia are fluid and ever-changing as religion and politics work together in symphonia.

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Enslaving the New World: Captivity and Slavery in Native North America

Mark Reynolds

The word slavery has a deeply rooted and emotional place in the history of the United States. As Americans confront our past and slavery's role in it, we often think about enslavement in unidirectional terms – white descendants of Europe buying, selling, and profiting from the coerced labor of black descendants of Africa. This image of chattel slavery has persisted in the American historical imagination as the definitive form of bondage primarily due to the traumatic and fractious experience surrounding the Civil War. The historical weight of the Civil War and the lack of a proper resolution of its central issue has led to a focus on African slavery in film, television, and literature more than 150 years on. From Harriet Beecher Stowe's 1852 novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* to Steve McQueen's 2013 Academy Award winning film *12 Years a Slave*, the national discussion concerning American slavery has often focused on just one particular legacy within a broader story. Despite the profitability of the Southern plantation system and its reliance on coerced black labor it hardly represents the full experience of enslavement in North America. In the Southwestern and Southeastern United States, a vibrant economy thrived on the capture and sale of Native American bodies, both by European colonists and the Native peoples themselves. Predating chattel slavery, Native captivity practices built on traditions which had been in place for untold generations. As colonization began to encroach into the indigenous way of life, however, these forms of captivity became increasingly intertwined with European notions about race and slavery. No less tangible or violent than African slavery, Native peoples' complex relationship with enslavement deserves to be recognized as a significant part the story of early America.

During the eighteenth century, slavery in North America came to define and reinforce racial and ethnic identities. African slavery existed in America from the foundation of its earliest European settlements. During the first decades of the colonial era, however, African-descended slaves enjoyed a level of autonomy that would be nearly unrecognizable by nineteenth century standards. African slaves in this period, according to James Merrell, "were traders, soldiers, and members of armed gangs…Blacks, like whites, spoke English or Spanish, sold European goods, and fought Indians when their low-country homes were threatened".[1] The seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries exhibited a much wider range of coerced labor systems in the colonies. Black slaves could frequently be seen toiling alongside Native American captives and white indentured servants. The harsh realities of colonial life required a more diverse labor force, as black slaves often performed many of the same undertakings as their masters.

As the events of the eighteenth century unfolded, however, slavery in America slowly became focused on newly formed racial hierarchies. This particular racialized worldview connected ethnic differences to social standing, while white Americans began to increasingly rely on the trade in and coerced labor of Africans. The eighteenth century abolitionist John Woolman spoke to the powerful connection between race and power then developing in America by stating, "Slavery [had become] connected with the Black Colour, and Liberty with the White." Further, Woolman argued that the reason Africans were targeted was, "because we [whites] have the Power to do it."[2] Woolman's blunt indictment demonstrates the changing relationship between race and slavery in the mid-eighteenth century. As white Americans began to enforce a colonial slave code, they abandoned a much older and more diverse institution.

Native American enslavement practices predate the first European contact, existing all across the continent for thousands of years.

In the fifteenth century, as Europeans came into contact with Native Americans for the first time, they encountered many thriving forms of captivity and enslavement throughout North and South America. Quickly contextualized within European notions of slavery, Native traditions of captivity were exploited by explorers for their own benefit. In reality, the systems of captivity they discovered differed greatly from those existing in Europe. Many Native peoples used kidnapping as a means of adoption. Rather than adhering to strict, immutable notions of race and ethnicity as Europeans and later Americans would, Native peoples often believed that behavior and status within society was malleable, regardless of cultural background.[3] Typically taken as spoils of war, captives could become completely incorporated into their captor's tribe, being adopted by new family, often receiving a new identity including a new name and appearance. The expectation was that these adoptees could replace those lost in combat. Whereas slaves permanently occupied the lowest class in European society, Native adoptees with the right conditioning could become full-fledged tribal members. Because most tribes believed this social conditioning was all that was necessary for captives to be fully incorporated, racial and ethnic traits did not factor into who was and was not taken captive.

African American captives often received treatment similar to that of other indigenous and white adoptees, as highlighted by the account of John Marrant. A free-born African American from New York, Marrant was taken captive by a Cherokee hunter in 1770. After being adopted into the chief's clan, Marrant lived the rest of his life as a full member of the Cherokee Nation, learning their language and other tribal customs.[4] Marrant was seen as an equal among

his Cherokee peers. Despite technically transitioning from free to captive, Marrant evidently had more liberty as a Cherokee captive than as a free American. Accounts of white captives, including that of John Hague, offer similar descriptions. Adopted by a Yuchi clan as a young boy, Hague went on to marry a Yuchi woman and father a number of children. A contemporary referred to Hague as, "as great a savage as any of them."[5] Neither Marrant or Hague's skin color played an important role in their adoptability, but rather it was age and sex that determined a captive's potential for incorporation into the new tribe.

For many Native nations in North America, children made ideal captives. In contrast to plantation slavery wherein adults made ideal agricultural laborers, the ability of children to easily pick up new languages and adapt to cultural norms and beliefs meant that they could be readily assimilated into new tribes. Fully grown adults were much more likely to resist the transformation. Because captivity cyclically followed warfare due to the need to replenish a tribe's population, young children that could be fully incorporated into clan life were especially targeted. This meant that during a raid, adult men would likely be killed while women and especially young girls and boys would be taken along with other resources as spoils of war. The fact that Marrant and Hague were both adopted into the tribes that kidnapped them speaks more to their young age than their appearance. Younger captives usually retained little or no memory of their previous culture which aided immensely in the assimilation process, but the adoption of older children and teenagers served a secondary purpose. Captives and adoptees often played a diplomatic role, moving between their birth society and the adopted one. Captives who could learn multiple languages made them uniquely suited to speak for both parties, particularly when taken between warring tribes. This played a big role not only in relations between tribes but also

between Native and colonial society. Older adoptees' command of both European and Native languages made them ideal translators, messengers, and advisers. During the American Revolution for instance, Georgia colonists negotiated with the Creek Nation, a delegation that included a white, female advisor, who was undoubtedly captured and incorporated into the Creek community as a child.[6] Both the demographic and diplomatic benefits of captivity led to its endurance for centuries among Native peoples across the continent.

As widely as captivity in the New World differed from the slavery emerging from the Old World, European explorers and settlers certainly witnessed a practice they could identify and exploit. From the earliest period of contact, Europeans exploited the labor of indigenous peoples in North America. According to Andrés Reséndez's book, *The Other Slavery,* "Columbus' very first business venture in the New World consisted of sending four caravels loaded to capacity with 550 Natives back to Europe, to be auctioned off in the markets of the Mediterranean."[7] Later Spanish conquistadors and settlers followed in Columbus' footsteps. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain built a thriving colonial economy in North America on the backs of indigenous labor. Where explorers found societies based on tribute and hierarchy, they instituted *encomiendas,* inserting themselves at the top. From there, they could benefit from the labor of all those below them. The slave economy in the Spanish colonies spiked in the 1520s after gold was discovered in Mexico, further fueling demand for slave labor. African slaves were certainly used in Spanish North America from the Caribbean to the Mexican mines, however an indigenous workforce that did not need to be shipped across the Atlantic was considerably more cost effective. This reliability of indigenous labor greatly diminished over

time as European diseases would often decimate Native populations. By the late seventeenth century, however, the face of enslavement in the Spanish colonies would be forever changed.

After nearly three hundred years of colonization, the Spanish Empire in North America reached as far north as the American Southwest, including parts of modern-day Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. With very little of the natural resources found in other parts of the colonial empire, the Spanish borderlands – particularly the colony of New Mexico – were exponentially less populated by European colonists. This meant that colonists had less control over the land and the people they interacted with. These Native peoples were generally categorized by the Spanish into two distinct groups. *Pueblos* were peoples that lived in sedentary tribal units or what the Spanish could identify as something resembling a European town. *Rancherías* on the other hand were highly mobilized hunter-gatherer groups. Following with the encomienda system instituted in Central America, the Spanish found the systematic and ordered Pueblo peoples easier to dominate and profit from. Yet, as they would come to find out, life in the borderlands was much more complicated.

By the summer of 1680, the Pueblo peoples of New Mexico formulated a plan to liberate themselves from Spanish colonial oppression. The ensuing Pueblo Revolt was predicated on returning to a previous, more autonomous way of life by removing all influence of Spanish colonialism and religion. In this the Pueblos were remarkably successful. According to Reséndez, on the tenth and eleventh of August 1680, the various Pueblos of New Mexico rose up in outright insurrection, “destroying houses, ranches, and churches and killing some four hundred men, women, and children, or about twenty percent of New Mexico’s Spanish population” including, “about two-thirds of all the friars living in New Mexico”.[8] Clearly,

religion was pivotal to the revolt and the removal of Spanish Catholicism was instrumental in returning to a previous way of life. When the dust finally settled, the Pueblos had expelled a majority of the Spanish presence from New Mexico. In *Violence Over the Land,* Ned Blackhawk describes this time for the Pueblos as regained autonomy, including that, "They enjoyed renewed religious freedoms, had greater mobility and communication, and no longer faced imposed economic and labor drafts."[9] Renewed rights and autonomy were also welcomed by Pueblo women, who were no longer subject to sexual abuse or the forced religious conversion of their children. Yet, far from returning to a simpler way of life, the Pueblo Revolt inadvertently generated an entirely new source of turmoil in the borderlands.

After twelve years of absence, the Spanish returned in 1692. Rather than returning to find the region as it was before, they quickly discovered drastic changes that had taken place in their absence. Without the authority and order imposed by colonists and missionaries, the various Pueblo peoples formed key alliances with many of the nomadic Rancherías to the north and east. Upon visiting the Hopi pueblo of Walpi in modern-day Northern Arizona, the leader of the *Reconquista* (or reconquering of New Mexico) Diego de Vargas observed many different nomadic and sedentary tribes all mixing about freely. Vargas noted that, "Some of them were of the Ute nation… and others were Apaches and Coninas [Havasupais], and all of them were the allies and neighbors of the Hopi pueblos."[10] In the twelve short years that the Spanish were absent, borderlands tribes had initiated a complicated web of alliances. The new players on the scene, the nomadic tribes, had traveled vast distances to participate in this new alliance system. The Utes from the Great Basin, the Apaches from the Southern deserts, and others moved into New Mexico, rekindling alliances that predate European colonialism and taking advantage of the

resources they left behind. The tribes that rose to power in the interim years were able to seize control of the most revolutionary resource abandoned by the Spanish: the horse.

Access to Spanish horses utterly transformed the borderlands and its people. The product of one of North America's largest and most successful slave revolts, the abandonment of vast herds of horses unintentionally created one of the planet's most powerful slaving empires. Access to horses not only granted greater mobility to nomadic tribes but also galvanized a vibrant trading economy virtually overnight. Tribes that wrested access quickly ascended above those without. Equestrian tribes, as they could now be referred, gained swift and considerable power as they could out-hunt, out-trade, out-fight, and therefore dominate horseless tribes across the continent. Equestrian tribes found new privilege among the Spanish, as they had become significantly more competitive traders and warriors.[11] This furthered their already growing regional dominance, allowing them to take captives in hitherto unimaginable numbers. By the time the Spanish returned to New Mexico in 1692, a vast slaving empire was already beginning to blossom across the Southwest and Southern Plains made entirely possible by the resources they left behind. As the Spanish quickly learned, they were no longer in control of the borderlands. That prestige belonged to powerful newcomers: The Comanches and the Utes.

The exact time of the Comanches' arrival in the Southwest is unknown, but the Spanish abandonment in the 1680s created a vacuum they were more than capable of filling. According to Blackhawk, the lack of Spanish authority and wider access to horses, "accelerated their territorial expansion, consolidated their band structure, and brought them into contact with the Utes".[12] The alliance of Comanches and Utes dominated the borderlands, as previously powerful tribes like the Navajos and Apaches eventually turned to the Spanish for protection against them.

Able to take full advantage of the herds of wild and domesticated horses, the *Comanchería* grew in power quickly enough to dominate the regional horse trade. Flexing their military power, the Comanches led countless slaving raids into Mexico and throughout the northern borderlands. In *War of a Thousand Deserts*, Brian De Lay argues that, for Comanches, "the immediate material incentives that drove raids into northern Mexico can be divided into three categories, in increasing order of significance: miscellaneous plunder, captives, and animals".[13] Miscellaneous plunder could be anything worth stealing in a raid from skins, food, or other important resources to metal goods like weapons and coins, yet the economic incentive of these easily tradeable goods paled in comparison to the latter two. The Comanches propelled a vicious cycle of violence and captivity in the borderlands by vastly increasing their military capabilities and trading territory. The demand skyrocketed for both a labor force to care for the massive herds of horses and also a valuable trade commodity with which to obtain more. Both could be easily supplied by taking captives across the massive Comanchería.

Slavery in eighteenth century Comanchería deviated significantly from earlier forms of kinship adoption. In many ways, Comanche enslavement practices were altered by the colonial framework. Many captives taken during Comanche raids would enter a life of near-chattel slavery, sold at Santa Fe's trade market to the Spanish or other tribal nations, possibly to be sold again and again. The burgeoning capital city of the New Mexico colony, Santa Fe's trade fairs supported this quickly expanding market in human flesh. Native peoples from across the Plains and Southwest – Utes, Apaches, Navajos, Comanches, and more, flocked to Santa Fe to buy and sell food, weapons, horses, and captives. The captives that were sold or ransomed in Santa Fe tended to be adult men, who were generally seen as unfit for tribal incorporation.[14] They did not

represent a majority of all captives taken, however. That majority, consisting of young people, both boys and girls, were not sold or ransomed back to their communities. Instead they often became lifelong members of the tribe, adopted by a particular clan. The primary value gained from these captives derived from the labor they supplied, rather than as a population and diplomatic enhancement as in eastern North American Native societies. This labor, according to DeLay, was deeply gendered, as "Captors almost always required boys to tend horses and mules" while females, "labored at a variety of daily chores, including gathering wood, fetching water, cooking, tending to children, repairing clothing, collecting wild foods and medicines, and disassembling, packing, moving, and reassembling camp".[15] The value of captive women was not limited to the labor they could provide. They remained targets of sexual abuse and reproduction which made adolescent girls perpetual prime targets in the New Mexican slave trade. According to Blackhawk, "Nonconsensual sexual relations between female captives and New Mexican patriarchs assured demographic growth and male sexual pleasures".[16] The strictly gendered labor practices prominently distinguish Native captivity from the developing chattel slavery system in the English colonies, wherein African American men and women often toiled side by side. It also offers insight into what Comanches and other Native peoples understood as masculine and feminine work.

As the English colonies began expanding into the interior South, into what would become the cotton kingdom of the nineteenth century, Native peoples encountered this evolving system of enslavement. According to Merrell, by the turn of the eighteenth century, "In a native world equally unfamiliar to both, whites probably were inclined to unite with their black companions, and Afro-Americans involved in the trade must have traveled, eaten, and slept alongside their

masters or partners".[17] The de facto equality on the frontier, as observed by the Catawba and others, would not last long. Coincident with English settlement of the South's inland frontier came the institutionalization of race-based slavery. By the middle of the eighteenth century, a racialized worldview was developing among the English colonists and their American successors. The adoption of such a worldview meant the establishment of the peculiar institution – racialized slavery was founded on the principle that varieties in human traits are immutable, inheritable, and that a natural hierarchy exists among these variable traits.[18] Among the Native tribes of the Southeast, including the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and others, captivity practices did not vary considerably from their Southwestern and Southern Plains counterparts. However, the tribes of the Southeast encountered what the Spanish borderland did not – a growing number of colonists, both white and black.

Before the middle of the eighteenth century, three empires competed for control over the interior South: the English centered in Virginia, the Spanish in Florida, and the French in New Orleans. Populations in the French and Spanish colonies never reached the heights of English Virginia and by the end of the Seven Years War, Great Britain's control of North America was cemented even further. The mid-eighteenth century saw British settlements moving further into the interior South, disrupting and displacing populations of Native peoples through violence and disease. According to William Cronon's *Changes in the Land,* European diseases took a devastating toll on Native populations across the continent, sometimes suffering a mortality rate as high as 95 percent.[19] The devastation wrought by the diseases and warfare of the encroaching colonists created a desperate need in Native societies for captives to replenish their dwindling numbers and a deep anxiety about the invading newcomers. Native peoples found it increasingly

difficult to maintain control over their lives and traditions. According to Christina Snyder's *Slavery in Indian Country*, when British settlers moved into Pensacola in 1764, the Creek Headman Wolf of Muccolossus remarked, "that all the land Round, was their hunting ground, and hinted, that as soon as the English began to settle the lands, they would declare War & begin to Scalp the Settlers".[20] The clear anxiety over British and American expansion expressed by the Creeks was felt across the interior South and marks the beginning of a new era in Anglo-Native relations; one with profound ramifications for both Native lives and how they interacted with the outside world.

Southern tribes took captives without much regard for race or ethnicity throughout the first 150 years of colonization; the accounts of both John Marrant and John Hague are testament to this. Yet just as European colonization influenced enslavement in the Spanish borderlands, the same would be true for the shrinking borderlands of the southeastern United States. While the American settlers continued to expand into the territory of the Southern tribes in the late eighteenth century, they brought with them not only disease but also an evolving racialized worldview. Tribes across the region increasingly began to adapt a more solidified sense of common ethnic identity in order to block the hordes of Anglo expansion and the racial othering that came with it. By and large, before American expansion, many Native peoples traditionally saw themselves as culturally or even ethnically different from one another. Euro-Americans, on the other hand, often lumped them together as one racial other, lower in the racial hierarchy. As a result, a nativist movement swept across the American borderlands following the American Revolution and the myriad border wars that followed. Snyder defines this by stating, "Native people increasingly began to think of themselves as 'red people', as a distinct, inherently

different people who owned their native ground by right of divine sanction".[21] The blossoming solidarity among Native peoples was predicated on a spiritual right to their ancestral lands which, despite being a traditional indigenous belief, was expanded in an effort to block the growingly aggressive American expansionism and preserve Native autonomy and integrity. Supporters of the Nativist movement believed that various Nations should keep from warring against each other to prevent the encroaching Americans from capitalizing on such fractiousness. As a result, captives tended to be adopted as orphans rather than as spoils of war.[22] Although the Nativist movement was ultimately unsuccessful at both solidifying a united pan-aboriginal Nation (as demonstrated by the aptly-named Chickasaw-Creek War of 1795), and at blocking American expansion into tribal lands, the racial solidarity advocated by the movement had a profound effect on Southern tribes, particularly in terms of enslavement.

With a renewed focus on solidarity, Native peoples in the Southeast began focusing instead on their American colonizers, both white and black. Unlike the many generations of captives before them, these American captives were largely not incorporated into the tribe, seen by many tribes as a common enemy. The result was a shift towards capturing American children primarily for ransom.[23] Thus, captivity in the Southern tribes was reinvented, trading generations of tradition for an economic and racial institution. Such an institution was unwelcome news for the African-descended population of the region. African Americans became prime targets for kidnapping and ransom regardless of age or sex. This follows a basic principle of the Southern slave economy in that white captives tended to be ransomed only back to their original families or communities. Black captives on the other hand usually garnered a larger ransom from a much wider array of customers. In the post-Revolution South, Native peoples used the escalating

racialization of American slavery to their economic and political advantage. Southern tribes adapted to survive the winds of change by reasserting their place in trade with the new republic, as well distancing themselves from another racial other subjugated by white society. Though transformed by the upheaval of American expansion, indigenous life in the interior South continued for at least a few more decades, though the ice continued thinning beneath their feet. The anxiety expressed by Muccolossus after the Seven Years War was ultimately brought to its most violent end in the 1830s as most of the Southern tribes were finally dislodged with the Indian Removal Act, one of the darkest entries in American history.

The changing face of slavery in Native America affected many different peoples across the continent and across the centuries. Native captivity in the first century-and-a-half of colonization, both in New Spain and in the English colonies, conveys a complicated and dynamic relationship of violence and expansion between colonists and indigenous peoples. Though hastened and altered by colonization, various forms of slavery had existed for centuries in North America by the time Europeans first stepped foot on the continent. In the Spanish borderlands, access to vast herds of European horses was pivotal to the rise of the Comanches, Utes, and other equestrian tribes, enabling them to build their empires of captivity. In the English colonies, disease and warfare were equally pivotal to the rise of Nativism and the resulting commercialization and racialization of Native enslavement practices. Southern tribes hoped to stifle expansion into their ancestral lands by kidnapping and selling people of African descent, thereby both strengthening their economic and political bond with the young republic and altering their own practices of enslavement to the extent that, by the nineteenth century, they closely mirrored that of the Euro-American plantation system. Both regions had long slaving

traditions that were both recognized and exploited by European settlers. Though the evolution of slavery in Native America ultimately rested in the deliberate actions of the indigenous peoples themselves, these decisions were made over many generations responding to the battle for autonomy and survival brought with European and American colonization.

As is the case with the enslavement of African-descended people, there is no one voice, no single perspective that quantifies or qualifies the experience of those enslaved in Native America. However, by examining the changes that took place across the continent and throughout multiple centuries, we can begin to craft a narrative, one shaped daily by the decisions of Native peoples in response to their changing circumstances. By framing this narrative within their perspectives, we see a story greatly in need of telling. As Americans confront our shared past as both enslavers and enslaved, the perspective of indigenous peoples and their complicated and evolving relationship with various forms of enslavement should be an integral part of that conversation.

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[1] James H. Merrell, "The Racial Education of the Catawba Indians" in *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), 369.
[2] Qtd. in William B. Hart, "Black 'Go-Betweens' and the Mutability of 'Race', Status, and Identity on New York's Pre-Revolutionary Frontier" in *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750-1830* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 95.
[3] Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 102.
[4] Ibid, 105.
[5] Ibid, 107.
[6] Ibid, 113.
[7] Andrés Reséndez, *The Other Slavery*, 3-4.
[8] Ibid, 156.
[9] Ned Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 32.
[10] Qtd. in Andrés Reséndez, *The Other Slavery,* 174.
[11] Ibid, 176.
[12] Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land,* 35-36.
[13] Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 90.
[14] Ibid, 92.

[15] Ibid, 92.
[16] Ned Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land,* 78.
[17] James Merrell, "Racial Education", 367.
[18] William B. Hart, "Black 'Go-Betweens'", 94.
[19] William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 87.
[20] Qtd. in Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country*, 156.
[21] Ibid, 180.
[22] Ibid, 175.
[23] Ibid, 181.